Feodor Martens, Architect of the Hague Tradition of International Law by Eyffinger, Arthur
Feodor Martens, 
Architect of the Hague Tradition of International Law 
I. Introduction to Life and Works 1 
1. Status quaestionis 
Magnus vir cecidit: "a truly great man has passed away". The epic incipit of Prof. Holland's 
obituary written on the spur of Feodor Martens' untimely death in June 1909 duly reflects the 
fy 
heroic status of the celebrated Russian internationalist among his contemporaries. At the time, 
references like "Lord Chancellor of Europe", "Chief Justice of Christianity" or "Soul of the 
Hague Peace Conference" were among the household epithets of Martens who, from 1901 on-
wards figured invariably on the shortlist of the Oslo Nobel Committee. 
These are no meagre titles indeed. Nor were they entirely idle in the days they were bestowed. A 
full century ago, in the world that summoned the Hague Peace Conferences, Feodor Martens' 
reputation in Europe was impressive by all standards. Slated as perhaps the most expert arbitrator 
of his time, he was also the staunch advocate of humanitarian principles and auctor intellectualis 
of both the ill-fated 1874 Brussels Declaration and the 1899 Hague Convention on the laws and 
customs of war. Martens had received honorary doctorates from Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, 
and Yale. He was the bearer of knight's orders from France and Austria, member of the Institut 
de France and the British Academy, and boasted a world-wide network spanning the domains of 
high politics and diplomacy as readily as the circles of international lawyers or the world of 
L On Martens' life: Barclay, in: 1 JSCL (1902) 109; Jacobson, in: 1 La Vie Internationale (1903) 335-339; Fried, 
in: 11 Friedenswarte (1909) 121-122; Holland, in: 10 JSCL (1909) 10-12; Kamarowsky, in: 23 AIDI (1910) 538-
543; Wehberg, in: 20 ZIR (1910) 343-357; De Melville, Frederic von Martens, 1912; Nussbaum, in: 22 ASJG 
(1952) 
51-66; Pustogarov, Our Martens: F.F. Martens, international lawyer and architect of peace, 2000 (transl. 
Butler; orig. in Russian, 1993; French ed. 1999); id. in 36 IRRC (1996) 300-314; Grabar, The history of inter-
national law in Russia 1647-1917, 1990; Kross, Professor Martens' Departure, 1994 (orig. Estonian 1984, 
French ed. 1990). 
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peace apostles. In short, Martens was a prominent public figure in the Europe of the fin-de-
siecle. Whoever dared so much as question his word was sure to experience the length of his 
arm.3 
By the same token, Martens' acclaim was never general, nor did his outspoken views go uncon-
tested. His numerous polemics with Westlake, Barbosa, or poor Danewsky constitute a chapter 
of their own in the history of internationalism.4 In a way, Martens' career epitomizes this world 
of pioneers from the first decades of the Institut and the Days the Law was Won. Martens emi-
nently represented his day and age in being the Man For All Seasons: a weather-beaten politician 
and diplomat, a seasoned privy council, a committed peace apostle, a gifted scholar and a dedica-
ted teacher. Still, with him, the transition of seasons often went on a sliding scale and, invariably, 
the politician crept in, in what seemed almost a subconscious process.5 With Martens, national 
feeling and international thought somehow marched hand in hand. He was, for all intents and 
purposes, among those early champions of the Institut who stormed the haughty bulwarks of 
reactionary diplomacy to carve themselves a niche and establish the Rule of Law in a world that 
still knew of no codes.6 Yet, in the glowing debate within this learned body, his views were 
invariably on the conservative side. More than this, at times, his sincere longing for peace in the 
eyes of colleagues blurred his views on the law. Nussbaum's all too stern verdict was that, at the 
end of the day, Martens "was not a man of the law", but had definitely deserved to become a 
Nobel laureate.7 
To be sure, Martens' preoccupations were, first and foremost, with the acute needs of his day and 
age, both in the national and international domains, and irrespective of borderlines of disciplines 
or niceties and subtleties of theory. This was his forte which, at the conference table, often made 
a difference. Still, as a natural consequence, the impact of his endeavours was eminently time-
3' Cf. the polemics with Danewski on Russian-Chinese relations. Pustogarov 2000, 135ff., Nussbaum 1952, at 56 
and 61-62. 
4- Nussbaum 1952 at 56-57 and 61-62. 
5' Cf. Wehberg in 20 ZIR (1910)at 351: "Man wird freilich in v. Martens keinen reinen Idealisten erblicken diirfen. 
Er wahr wohl gleichzeitig ein russischer Politiker." 
6' In 1874 Martens was elected to the Institut de droit international, which he would serve as vice-president in 
1885 and 1894. An assiduous attender of its Annual Meetings, where he cherished many friends, Martens was on 
the small committee which, in summer 1880, met at Bluntschli's house in Heidelberg to finalise Moynier's draft 
Manuel des lois de la guerre sur terre, which resulted in the famous 1888 Oxford Manual. Over the years, he 
reported on such varying issues as the Suez Canal, consular procedure, the slave trade, international waterways, 
and the concept of an international bureau. See Pustogarov 2000, at 146. 
7' Nussbaum 1952, at 62. Between 1901 and 1908, Martens was indeed a prominent candidate for the highest peace 
award on the shortlist of the Oslo Committee. From 1902 he was expected to become a laureate any time. His 
name was successively submitted to the Committee by Goos, Matzen, Harburger, Rouard de Card, Bj0rns0n, 
Lammasch, Nys a.o.; Information Nobel Institute, courtesy Mrs. Anne Kjelling. 
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bound, indeed to the extent that his renown evaporated along with the society he stood for, in the 
onslaught of the Guns of August. Unlike the repute of Asser, or Holland, or Renault, whose de-
tached theoretical speculation withstood the test of time, Martens' name was virtually effaced by 
o 
later generations. After the cataclysm of the Great War and the Revolution Martens was summa-
rily dismissed at home as a reactionary and abroad as a Czarist opportunist.9 
The bottom-line, however, was reached a full forty years after Martens' demise, in 1949, with 
the publication in the American Journal of incriminating recollections from a former staff mem-
ber of parties in the 1899 Orinoco-case regarding Martens' alleged mishandling of procedure and 
abusing his chairmanship to intimidate parties.10 These accusations, influenced Nussbaum's 
devastating verdict from 1952, which we may briefly recall here.11 If, to be sure, Martens could 
count as the founder, codifier and first historian of the Russian discipline of international law, the 
severe British critic maintained, what struck the modern observer most in Martens' chef 
d'oeuvre, the International Law of the Civilised Nations (1882), apart from its obscure and 
idiosyncretic systematization of the discipline, was the author's flagrant lack of objectivity and 
conscientiousness. Especially in his laborious articles in the Revue, still according to Nussbaum, 
Martens had made himself known, first and foremost, as the champion of Czarist opportunism 
and the apologist of cynical expansionism, whose "very natural, but perhaps a bit exclusive 
patriotism" had actually more than once embarrassed the journal's general editor Rolin-
Jacquemins.12 In short, in his scholarly work Martens had confessed himself the consistent 
advocate of the principle of expediency.13 In the same tenor, the British critic asserted, Martens' 
views on arbitration as an essentially political institution, had been dictated by his Petersburg 
superiors. The justified suspicion and indignation these tenets had met had been their inevitable 
and well-deserved outcome. 
8' Wehberg (1910) at 343: "Nach dem Tode v. Martens hat man seiner Verdienste kaum erinnert." 
9' See Pustogarov 2000 at 4ff. Extradited as a "Tsarist Old Hand" or simply forgotten, no reference to Martens is 
found in the 1925-26 Russian Encyclopedia of State and Law, the 1938 Great Soviet Encyclopedia, and the 3-
volume History of Dplomacy from the 1960s. Even Grabar is distinctly chary in his praise (Grabar 1990, at 464). 
As regards the rception before the Revolution cf. Pustogarov 2000 at 33ff., with references to Levin, Nolde, 
Taube, Grabar, Danewski and Kamarovski. Russian censure of Martens' life and work started with Kama-
rovski's obituary in 23 AIDI (1910) 538-43. 
la Schoenrich, in 43 AJIL (1949) at 523-30. 
1L Nussbaum 1952 at 58-60. 
1 2 ' As for the titles, see below, nt. [54], The primary reference is to Martens' fervent contribution in 9 RDILC 
(1877) 49ff., on which Rolin observed in an editor's footnote that these expressed "the very natural, but perhaps 
a bit exclusive patriotism" of his "eminent collaborator of St. Petersburg". Cf. Nussbaum 1952 at 56. 
1 3 ' Cf. Pustogarov 2000 at 147ff. Cf. in this context also the articles written by Charles Marvin, which were first 
published as Annexes to Our Martens (2000), W.E. Butler's English version of Pustogarov's biography from 
1993. 
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And there was more to it, Nussbaum insisted. Allegations of tendentious distorting or suggestive 
omission of facts had clung to Martens' works from early on. On various occasions, he argued, 
close colleagues like Lammasch, Geffken and Holland had pressed stringent censure of this 
nature.14 Others had voiced their surprise at Martens' apparent unawareness of this aspect of his 
work and his disarming naivete in these matters. If admittedly entitled to a prominent rank as 
researcher of international law and relations, thus read Nussbaum's final verdict, to Martens 
international law was not "something different from, and in a sense above, diplomacy." Legal 
argument served him merely as a refined art of rhetoric. Keeping this in mind, his occasional 
grandiloquent phrases and public addresses rang insincere.15 
We will have the occasion to evaluate this stern verdict later on. Suffice to say here that later 
generations somewhat recanted these acerbics. Still, it is only fairly recently, by virtue of poli-
tical circumstance, the opening up of archives, and the personal efforts of Vasili Pustogarov and 
W.E. Butler16, that critics are making volte-face again. Recent harvest on Martens has been imp-
ressive on all accounts: the publication of his diaries; a new biography by Pustogarov; a novel by 
Jaan Kross, a bust in the Peace Palace instigated by Mr. Jeltsin himself; and commemorative 
conferences in St. Petersburg and Estonia17. Last but not least, the topicality of humanitarian law 
and recent case-law of both ICJ and ICTY prompted an avalanche of comments on that 
1 S 
bewilderingly elusive gem of diplomacy, the "Martens Clause". The intriguing figure of 
Martens, in short, is back on the map of internationalism and, by all appearances, there to stay. 
The present article will focus essentially on what must be deemed Martens' Finest Hour. It will 
address his perhaps most lasting contribution to internationalism, his truly pivotal role in 
establishing the Oeuvre de la Haye, both in terms of legal substance and with regards to its 
1 4 ' On Holland's censure of Martens' views as often primarily representing the diplomatist see 10 JSCL (1909) 10-12. 
On Lammasch's censure of the 1882 treatise as deliberately ommitting well-known facts see 11 ZPORG (1884) 
at 405ff, notably at 419. All this is very true; still, by the same token, Holland's obituary is a fairly balanced 
review of Martens' merits, while Lammasch worked diligently and in the best of harmony with Martens on 
arbitration panels and was his steadfast supporter at the Oslo Nobel Committee. Also, his appraisal of Martens' 
work at The Hague in 1899 is very favourable; see 11 ZIR 26ff. As for Geffken's censure of Martens' discussion 
of treaty law in his 1882 treatise, see 11 RDILC (1884) at 104. 
1 5 ' Nussbaum 1952 at 60. 
1 6 , Not just as translator, but cf. his Introduction to Pustogarov 2000. 
1 7 ' Pustogarov's biography was first published in 1993; Kross' novel in 1994. Martens' bust was unveiled in the 
Hague Peace Palace in 1999. Conferences were held in 1999 and 2003 in St. Petersburg (RAIL) and in 
Tallinn/Parnu in Estonia. 
1 8 ' On the Martens Clause see Horn, in 3 HR (1990), 168-7; Ticehurst, in 37 IRRC (1996), 125-134; Pustogarov, in 
1 JHIL (1999), 125-135; Schircks, in 12 HV (1999), 167-69; Cassese, in 11 EJIL (2000), 187-216; Meron, in 
94 AJIL (2000), 78-89. Meron, in Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989) 46; id. 
Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung. Festschr. Bernhardt (1995), at 173-77; Benvenuti "La Clausola 
Martens", in Festschrifft Barile (19950 at 173-224; Schircks, Die Martens'sche Klausel; Rezeption und Rechts-
qualitat, 2001. 
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material implementation: the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Peace Palace itself. Still, a 
brief sketch of Martens' life and works up to that juncture may not come amiss. 
2. The Making of a Career 
So much at least the above has shown that in order to properly evaluate the figure and views of 
Feodor Martens we must delve deep into that complex and multi-faceted world of late nine-
teenth-century Europe. A society which, utterly divided in a stalemate of political blocks, was in 
desperate search of instruments to stop that unsettling demon of the armaments race. Again, a 
society which saw its greatest boast, that is, the unprecedented material growth, merely help 
deepen the social rift by the day. Vaguely realizing that it was heading for the abyss, it was at a 
loss how to preclude the cataclysm. In this, the incorrigible self-complacency of the establish-
ment was paralysed by the uncompromising fanaticism of socialists and the nihilism of anarc-
hists. In order to break this deadlock, this world could muster but few enough tools: the abstruse 
idealism of pacifists - and that newly emerging legal discipline of internationalists. Still, like all 
newcomers in the political arena, these legal luminaries were looked upon askance by the 
establishment. One should not forget that in The Hague, in 1899, all too numerous were the 
diplomats who resented the intrusion by law professors, mere technocrats in their eyes, into their 
privileged circles. 
Feodor Martens criss-crossed this caleidoscopic world for some thirty-five years. Onto this 
meandering he set out with a number of severe handicaps of both private and public nature. With 
hindsight one might say that his career prospered against all odds.19 Having been born in a far-
flung province, from no pedigree if not German, Martens was raised in an orphanage. This pedi-
gree was not exactly conducive to recommending him to the elitist circles of the St. Petersburg 
aristocracy.20 Nor was a legal training of much help, outside the strictly academic world that is. 
At least in Martens' own perception, it earmarked him as a toiling work horse, whose technical 
expertise could be profited from or ignored at will. Along the borders of the Neve, as all over 
1 9 ' From Pustogarov's pages the vicissitudes of Martens' life are well-known. Fedor Fedorovich Martens was born 
on 15/08/1845 (Old Style) at Pernov in the Russian province of Livonia on the Baltic from relatively humble 
Estonian descent. Raised in German Lutheran surroundings, by the age of nine he had lost both parents. The 
orphan found shelter at the Lutheran Church gymnasium in St. Petersburg where, in 1863, in the days of social 
upheaval and reform following Alexander II's manifesto, he was enrolled in the law faculty. Upon his gradua-
tion, in 1867, he embarked on a peregrinatio to Leipzig, Vienna, and Heidelberg, where the teachings of 
Bluntschli and Lorenz von Stein left a lasting mark, prompting his switch from criminal and constitutional to 
international law. 
2 0 ' At a certain stage Martens changed his name from the German Friedrich Frommhold to the Russian Fedor 
Fedorovich. In 1879 Martens was married to Ekaterina Tur, a Lutheran and daughter of a senator and privy 
councillor; the marriage was harmonious; see Pustogarov 2000 at 329fF. 
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reactionary Europe, Themis was still seen as a mere hand-maiden to diplomacy. Still, Martens, 
not unlike Cicero himself, if being a homo novus, keenly aspired at entering this world. Some of 
the most severe pitfalls of his career were the predictable outcome of this deliberate choice. 
Clearly, at home, Martens never really belonged, and due to his overt ambitions, he was an all 
too ready toy in the hands of his successive superiors at the Ministry. Thus, in 1898, he was allu-
red into drawing up the programme of the Hague Peace Conference with vain promises to be 
invested with the chairmanship of the Delegation and an ambassadorship in The Hague to fol-
low. In the end, he was not even lodged in the same hotel as De Staal and the other plenipoten-
91 
tiaries. His complaints of maltreatment and of instances when decisions on paramount issues 
were taken against his better advice as privy council are legio - still, it was Martens who let it 
happen. In this, yet another streak of character served his superiors at will, to wit, Martens' 
indefatigable zeal and industry. "Labor omnia vincit" read his life-long motto, which of course, 
if not strikingly original, was praiseworthy.22 But one recalls the maxim of that epitomy of 
diplomacy: "Pas de zele, surtout pas de zele". With time, Martens would learn the truth of that 
word. 
Over the years, Martens served as privy council to no less than six Foreign Ministers and, for a 
span of some three decades, helped steer, indeed to the outside world personified Russian foreign 
policy. A prominent delegate at all major congresses from Brussels through San Stefano and 
Berlin to The Hague, and including all Geneva Red Cross and Tobias Asser's private law confe-
rences, he proved himself to be a competent negotiator. Still, it would seem that he was not the 
born diplomat by intuition. Witness to this is his appraisal of the negotiations in Portsmouth 
when, in calling the peace treaty a disgrace, he most likely misjudged the pragmatism of a supe-
rior diplomat, Count Witte.24 Having made up his mind as to the desirable, Martens, notably in 
his later years, easily lost sight of the attainable. 
2L With the years, Martens' ambitions grew ever more disproportionate with his subaltern position. Numerous 
indeed were the humiliations his peacock had to swallow. His persistent complaints that, on more than one 
occasion (Port Arthur, Boxer Revolt, Suez crisis, Portsmouth), official policy decided against his better views, 
should be read from this perspective. See Pustogarov 2000 at 244ff. 
2 2 ' On this, friend and foe easily agreed. Cf. Wehberg 1910 at 346: "Tatendrang", "Uebereifer". 
2 3 ' Martens entered the Foreign Office in 1869. This step, to a large extent, was to determine the course of his life. 
A permanent member of its Council since 1881, he served Gorchakov, Giers, Lobanov-Rostovski, Muraviev, 
Lambsdorf and Witte and, through invaluable advise, helped shape Russian foreign policy from Brussels 1874 to 
The Hague 1907. Cf. Pustogarov 2000 at 217ff. 
24 Portsmouth 1905: Postugarov 2000 at 284ff. 
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3. Personality 
Stealthily we have already come to review some characteristics of Martens' personality. In this 
respect, one is bound to acknowledge, the appraisals of contemporaries are not in all respects 
flattering. To go by the reports, Martens struck one as rather stiff, formal, and reserved. Impec-
cably correct, he was not easily approachable to intimate friendship. Somewhat shy and introvert 
by nature, he would not exactly put one at ease in private conversation. One wonders whether 
perhaps Martens lacked some of that social grace and refined elegance that often comeswith a 
gentle upbringing. There was rarely a smile to grace his countenance. Martens was not the type 
of man to bear his uncontested, impressive learning lightly; he is described as lacking all hu-
mour.25 He was, by all reports, a man who rather felt at home in the study than in the salon. 
Reports indeed that recall Hugo Grotius' meddlings with the Paris salons of his days. It is obser-
ved at The Hague that, as an orator, Martens lacked the glowing eloquence of Leon Bourgeois or 
the burning idealism of d'Estournelles de Constant. With Martens no tact as with White, Nigra or 
Choate to pamper colleagues in a preparatory tete-a-tete, nothing of Asser's subtle acuteness and 
refined sagacity, or the temperament of Barbosa and Drago. If by all means prominent and res-
pected among his colleagues, he was essentially a loner whose authority was undisputed but who 
would not be called a personal friend by too many. 
Contemporaries never stopped wondering at these social "flaws". All too frequent are the critics, 
also from unbiased sources, notably in Martens' later days, pointing to his plunging headlong 
into ill-prepared propositions without previous consultation of his superiors or having ascertai-
ned himself as to the attainability of his ideas - then to find himself left out in the cold. Reports 
from 1907 are most severe: uncompromising, rigid, unyielding, obstinate. On this occasion, his 
tact was likewise questioned. Memoirs from delegates often enough refer to casual caustic re-
marks of his which caused unnecessary rancour at the conference table. We will later qualify 
some of these statements. And let us bear in mind that, as a representative of a whimsical auto-
crat Martens' position, often enough, must have been less than enviable. Suffice for now to 
conclude that figures of lesser stature would most likely have seen their careers wrecked from 
these social shortcomings. Surprisingly enough, Martens' career never did. For this there were 
many reasons. 
2 5 ' Close reading of the proceedings of the Hague Conferences would suggest a qualification of this verdict. 
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4. Powers of Will and Persuasion 
The reasons for Martens' prominence and his being indispensable at home seem obvious. For 
one, within the Russian diplomatic service, no one could by any length touch his massive exper-
tise, vast learning, or command of facts and figures. Also, his perfect command of Western 
languages, be this French, German, or English, was unparalleled in these circles. Still, at the end 
of the day, other aspects counted most. At both Hague Conferences diplomats, military men and 
lawyers alike were stunned by the virtual absence within the body of the Russian delegation of 
any expertise in handling diplomatic gremia of the kind. President De Staal was, by general app-
raisal, the sweetest of men, but otherwise a non-entity. Well-beloved by all, if not for Martens he 
was at a loss the moment he was faced with a hundred delegates expectantly awaiting his lead. 
As for Russia's technical representatives, all delegates easily agreed that they consistently mis-
carried their own propositions and with just a little help from German or, as the case might be, 
English or American delegates were able to wreck whatever they proposed of their own accord. 
From day one, when put to the test, they became trapped in technicalities and endless minutiae. 
Martens was the one and only exception. If, in 1899, he was heralded as the Soul of the Confe-
rence, it was also because, from his vast experience, he knew the tools of the trade. His chair-
manship of the Second Commission was an unqualified success. Martens was very much in 
control. Numerous indeed were the occasions where he himself broke a deadlock or came up 
with conciliating terms. In this, a consistent and predominant element of his career came to the 
fore, the implications of which we will inquire in some detail later on. Martens worked essen-
tially for peace and the final settlement of dispute - arguably, as has often been asserted, at the 
cost of the law. The spirit of the law meant more to him than strict legalistic interpretation. 
rye 
Besides, if fervently representing his nation and notwithstanding all his alleged patriotic zeal , 
he never lost sight of the wider context.27 In perusing the addresses he made in 1899 and 1907, 
one is struck by the broad scope of his outlook.28 However, what in the end made the difference 
2 6 ' Martens felt pride in the humanitarian tradition of the Romanovs. Throughout his life, he never failed to extoll 
the initiatives taken by Catherina the Great, Alexander I, Alexander II and Alexander III in these respects, indeed 
much to the amusement of delegates at conferences. Cf. e.g. Scott Proceedings II 1907 at 741, meeting of 24 
June 1907: "Catherine II ... was the first to lay down the basis of the rights and obligations of neutrals." Or the 
reference to Alexander I after the battle of Leipzig in La paix et la guerre 1901 at 73ff. Alexander II was 
Martens's great hero; see e.g. his Conference de la Paix 1900 at 23 and 37 ("le Tsar Liberateur"). 
2 7 ' Cf Wehberg 1910 at 348:"Gerade dort, wo es sich nicht um ganz bestimmte, jetzt erfiillbare Forderungen 
handelte, sondern um die grossen prinzipiellen Gesichtspunkte, tritt uns v. Martens Geist in seiner ganzen Kraft 
und seinem Idealismus am schonsten entgegen. Hier wachst sein Sehnen mitunter uber das seiner Mitarbeiter 
weit hinaus und gleichsam prophetenhaft sieht er mit leuchtenden Augen die Zukunft. Wertvolle, tiefe Worte hat 
er in solchen Stimmungen gesprochen." 
2 8 ' Cf. his address on June 6, 1899 on "the vital interests of peaceful, unarmed populations"; Scott, Proceedings at 
503/4. Also the Martens Declaration of June 20; Scott, Proceedings at 547-48. 
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at the conference table, was his sheer persuasiveness. Faced with whatever audience, Martens 
never failed to impress people, at least momentarily - and cashed in immediately. Martens' repu-
tation, I venture to say, was made not in writ, but in oral presentation, by the dominating impact 
of his sheer presence. 
Still, as Nussbaum would ripost, one has to draw the line. Martens, he argued, in fulfilling his 
role at the Orinoco arbitration panel, had actually resorted to personal intimidation, if not 
downright blackmail, to have affairs turned his way. We will deal with that later but, no denying, 
Martens' willpower must have been overwhelming at times. Andrew Carnegie's wilful pacifism 
has sometimes been scoffed at as "peace at all cost". Martens had different means at his disposal, 
but if the latter strung a chord with the former, this may have been more than just coincidence. 
And Martens' adrenaline must have run high that summer of 1899. Commuting between Paris 
and The Hague by night train several times a week, he managed either to reschedule or postpone 
meetings at either end, or single-handedly reopen debates that were considered long settled. A 
typical incident is his own record of how, having stumbled into a wedding ceremony in Paris one 
afternoon in July, he reproduced the words of advise he had overheard the priest give to the 
young couple the next day at the Conference table: "dans les grandes choses - l'unite\ dans les 
petites choses - la liberte; dans toutes les choses - la charite! "29 
It is not easy, and probably premature, to rule the verdict of a man who has been portrayed as a 
cynicist by lawyers, but was acclaimed as an idealist by Peace apostles, a steadfast positivist by 
some, one with naturalist leanings by others. Pace Barclay's verdict that "his observations are 
characterised by a juridical discrimination which, while Germanic in the subtlety of its distinc-
tions, is French in clearness of enunciation", Martens was not primarily the philosopher-theore-
tician.30 His was not the eminently speculative mind of Asser or Renault. In this author's app-
raisal, Martens' approach to society, and consequently to the law, was an eminently pragmatic 
one. Still, before evaluating Martens' role in The Hague, it may serve our purpose to try and 
pinpoint Martens' theoretical positioning in the field. 
2 9 ' See La Conference de la Paix 1900 at 38. 
3 0 - Barclay 1902 at 109. 
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5. The Manual on International Law 31 
Starting off as a teacher of constitutional law, by 1871 Martens gradually succeeded the physi-
cally fragile Ivanovski at the chair of international law in St. Petersburg. He would occupy the 
chair as an ordinarius for no less than 30 years (1876-1905). From day one, Martens' approach 
was a provocative disclaim of tradition. In his opinion the legal structuring of the international 
arena was dictated by diplomatic practice. From these convictions sprang his 15-volume compre-
hensive survey of treaties concluded by Russia from the days of Westphalia. The work of a life-
time, it was justly hailed as the veritable encyclopedia of Russian foreign relations.32 If 
Pustogarov' monograph on Martens bears the title "Our Martens", this was not just to distinguish 
Feodor from his celebrated German namesake of a previous century33, but also to stress their 
parallel roles in assessing their respective national legal traditions. 
If 1899 would become Martens' finest hour, this was also by virtue of a traumatic experience a 
full 25 years earlier which refocused his interest for the remainder of his life. Undoubtedly, 1874 
was the all-decive year in Martens' career. The Brussels conference marked his entrance into the 
world of diplomacy. Second to Baron Jomini, Martens both inspired and actually drafted the 
Declaration which was meant to put a halt to endless reprisals and mitigate the most severe 
consequences of war for civilians. The frustrating experience of the negotiating process and the 
failure of ratification at the end of the day turned Martens into a man with a mission and made 
him confiscate humanitarian law as his acknowledged territory. It accounted for his personally 
taking up the presidency of the Second Commission in The Hague in 1899. Martens confiscated 
a similar role of prominence for himself at the Crimean War peace conferences of San Stefano 
and Berlin, advocating legal idealism as against Malthusian military realism. Appreciating war 
as primarily a clash of national interests and personal aspirations, his firm objective was the 
3L Martens' major publications were the following. The Law of private property in times of war, 1869 (in Russian); 
Consuls and Consular Jurisdisction in the Orient,, 1873 (diss, in Russian; German transl. 1874); Recueil des 
traites et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances etrangeres, 1648-1906 (15 vols., 1874-1909). The 
Eastern War and the Brussels Conference, 1878 (in Russian; French transl. 1901); La Russie et l'Angleterre dans 
l'Asie centrale, 1879 (transl. in Russian, German, and English); Le conflit entre la Russie et la Chine, ses 
origines, son developpement et sa portee universelle, 18880 (transl. in Russian and German); La question 
egyptienne et le droit international, 1882; The contemporary international law of the civilised nations; 1882-83 
(orig. Russian, 2 vols., German ed. 1883-86, French 1883-87, Spanish 1894; also in Serbian, Japanese, Persian 
and Chinese transl.); Memoire sur le telegraphe en Chine, 1883; La conference du Congo a Berlin, et la politique 
coloniale des etats modernes, 1886; Memoire sur l'affaire Zappa, 1893; La conference de la paix a la Haye, 
1901; La paix et la guerre, 1901 (orig, in Russian); Par la justice vers la paix, 1907. 
3 2 , The reference is to Feodor Martens' 15-volume comprehensive survey of treaties concluded by Russia with fo-
reign nations from the days of Westphalia, which was published between 1874-1909. Cf. Pustogarov 2000 at 31-
38. On Georg Friedrich Martens see Les fondateurs du droit international 1904 (ed./introd. A. Pillet) at 602-676 
(H. Bailby). 
3 3 ' Georg Friedrich Martens (1756-1821) and, to a lesser degree, Charles Martens (1790-1863). 
26 
Feodor Martens, Architect of the Hague Tradition of International Law 
framing of a proper legal conscience. From 1884 he was permanent representative at the Red 
Cross conferences. 
The year 1874 also saw Martens elected to the Institut de droit international, which he would 
serve as vice-president in 1885 and 1894. An assiduous attender of the Annual Meetings, where 
he cherished many friends, Martens was on the small committee which, in summer 1880, met at 
Bluntschli's house in Heidelberg to finalise Moynier's draft Manuel des lois de la guerre sur 
terre, which resulted in the famous 1888 Oxford Manual}*' Over the years, he reported on such 
varying issues as the Suez Canal, consular procedure, the slave trade, international waterways, 
and the concept of an international bureau.35 
In 1880 Martens was co-founder of the Russian Association of International Law. Shortly after-
wards his chef d'oeuvre was published, the two-volume Manual of international law of the Civi-
lised Nations. It was a pivotal event. The work constituted nothing less than the first ever 
exposure of the Russian international law tradition, and was reviewed eagle-eyed by European 
critics. It saw French and German editions (surprisingly enough no English, and was rendered 
into Serbian, Persian, and Japanese.37 Its reception was generally favourable, although not 
without qualifications.38 Perhaps the part best appreciated was Martens' lengthy historical intro-
duction to the Russian tradition of international law. If deemed coloured at times, it was a 
Fundgrube of factual dates highly appreciated by contemporary scholars.39 
Structure 
Censure was most severe with respect to the structuring of the work. The treatise was published 
in the days when, following Von Ompteda's attempt at systematisation, the classical Grotian 
dichotomy of the discipline into laws of war and laws of peace was gradually being replaced by 
the modern concepts of formal and material law. Martens' somewhat eccentric dichotomy of the 
discipline into general principles on the one hand and administrative law on the other, a concept 
borrowed from the public law sphere, did not comply with the prevailing mainstream of contem-
3 4 ' Holland 1909 at 10. 
3 5 ' See above, nt. [5], 
3 6 ' Two volumes, 1882-83, repr. Moscow 1996. The word "civilised", which at the time, and with the widening 
circle of internationalism, gradually came to replace "Christian" had a very distinct meaning to Martens; see be-
low at p. [=]. On Martens' international law theories in general see Pustogarov 2000 at 49-86. 
3 7 ' Interestingly enough, no English edition was ever published. Nussbaum has a point in asserting that the various 
translations into languages of wwcivilised nations, that could not boast an intellectual elite served mainly to voice 
the Russian foreign policy. 
3 8 ' Critical notes by Geffken in 16 RDI(1884) 104, and by Bulmerincg in 15 i?D7(1883) 630. 
3 9 ' On Martens' stature as a historian and his numerous tracts in this discipline see Pustogarov 2000 at 38-40. 
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porary thought. It was liable to the censure of not being based on a distinctly international legal 
concept. As many of his colleagues, Martens was probably still too much steeped in Roman and 
public law traditions to arrive at fully satisfying results in his endeavours to create an ordo certus 
for the discipline. While therefore his presentation of the discipline was not generally deemed 
convincing, what was perhaps more to the point: it was not typically Russian, nor was it all his 
own. Martens' doctrine was, at its core, the reflection of his prolonged stay in Heidelberg during 
his formative years and the concept of Verwaltungsrecht advocated by his two foremost teachers 
of that period, Bluntschli and Lorenz von Stein.40 
Meanwhile, the merits of the work are many. It allows us to see Martens elaborating his views in 
the triangle of politics, morals and law at a fairly early stage. In the building process towards an 
international order, Martens distinguished three historical phases: the pre-Westphalian era of 
natural law; the pre-Vienna age of naive positivism; finally, the growth of synthesis attained in 
tli 
the 19 century. With international communications intensifying by the day - it was maintained 
- compliance, self-constraint and consensus had become the only natural prerequisites for the 
proper functioning of modern international society. These norms had to be consolidated in the 
international rule of law. In advocating this, Martens was far from being a Kantian utopist. 
Perpetual peace he deemed beyond reach. Inevitable dispute and conflict, and ensuing political 
excesses should be anticipated through international organization or else regulated through 
progressive codification, arbitration procedure and the development of humanitarian concepts. 
Intriguing in our context is his summary dismissal at that stage of contemporary projects for an 
international tribunal as chasing moonbeams.41 While deeming the growth of international admi-
nistration unstoppable, Martens did not advocate World Federalism or a United States of Europe, 
if only for its short-term unbalancing repercussions on society. This, incidentally, may be noted 
as a consistent element in Martens' tenets, the anxiety for social upheaval. To that extent at least, 
he was the product of the days following Alexander II's reforms. His goal was a free alliance of 
autonomous States, and he insisted on the role of international conferences in the developing 
process of a network of international agencies on a volitional basis. 
The domestic and the International Domains 
The work also elaborated on the role of the State. Ideally, in Martens' appraisal, the State-entity 
4 0 ' Upon his graduation in 1867 Martens embarked on a peregrinatio to Leipzig, Vienna, and Heidelberg. The 
teachings of J.C. Bluntschli (1808-81)at Heidelberg and Lorenz Von Stein (1815-90) at Vienna left a lasting 
mark on him. Stein first published a Verwaltungslehre in 1866; Martens' treatise of 1882 is dedicated to him. 
Bluntschli published a seven-volume Verwaltungslehre (1865-68). Both were prominent thinkers on the theory 
of State and Law. 
4 L Cf. Pustogarov 2000 at 73-74. 
28 
Feodor Martens, Architect of the Hague Tradition of International Law 
was based not on nationality but on cultural identity, its constitution the reflection of the people's 
shared social norms, values and ideals. The primary role of the State was to upkeep human 
rights, secure self-determination, and protect the individual from Hobbesian and Darwinian 
powerplay. Indeed, in Martens' perception, a nation's civilization was determined in the last 
resort by the legal position it attributed to the individual, and its concepts of "Sittlichkeit, Recht 
und Staat".42 
Martens' treatise also discussed the interplay between the domestic and international spheres. 
Here, the author confessed himself an outspoken dualist. He categorically dismissed any paralle-
lism between the domestic and international legal orders as being the products of fully indepen-
dent and historically incomparable social processes. In this, one must appreciate that, to the 
expert historian Martens, the organic processes of history had an almost normative value. Mean-
while, in his appraisal, it was precisely a nation's involvement in the international arena which 
testified to its cultural advancement. Already in his thesis on the Consular Laws he had called a 
nation's participation in international commerce "ein Gradmesser seiner Culturstufe".43 When 
discussing the international sphere Martens again explicitly refers to the human rights element as 
the ultimate criterion to assess the status of development of international law. Within the context 
of the time, this may actually be deemed quite remarkable 
Natural Law and Positivism 
Martens' manual relied on the acute observation of day to-day relations among the nations. 
Sobered by the prevailing contradictions, inconsistencies and perpetual changes in the internatio-
nal arena, its author relied rather on the conference table than on speculative theory. International 
law, in Martens' view, rested on diplomacy and therefore essentially on positive law. From this 
perspective, Martens' positivism has not often been questioned. Still, pinpointing him on the 
scale between natural law and positivism is no mean task. Actually, his treatise was innovative in 
focusing not on State-entities exclusively but rather emphasizing the social, legal, and cultural 
bonds of the international community.44 Martens somehow looked upon the State as an organic 
part of the Commonwealth of Man which recalls the best tradition of Stoic oikeioosis. By the 
same token, however, to him autonomy and territoriality were sacrosanct. He strictly limited 
interference with domestic affairs, albeit that he legitimized military intervention by civilized 
nations into barbaric realms, thus to check the persecution of Christians. This was criticised by 
42' Consularwesen 1873 at 8; Volkerrecht 18821 at 203ff. 
43' Consularwesen 1873 at 17. 
4 4 ' Pustogarov 2000 at 65-71. 
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many contemporary observers as treading a somewhat slippery track. His treatment of treaty law 
was considered by many to labour from much similar deficits.45 
The Concept of Civilised Nations 
And then of course there was this concept of the "Civilised Nation(s)" as reflected in the title of 
the work.46 To be sure, the concept was not Martens' own, but had become an increasingly cur-
rent one in literature since the days of the Holy Alliance. It encompassed the conglomerate of 
legal norms and customs that had been developed within the cultural and religious unity of the 
European tradition. With time they had become a normative canon also applied in the (former) 
colonies of the New World. To that extent the concept had gradually come to replace the pre-
vious references to the Christian Commonwealth. With the, at least formal, entrance of the Otto-
man Empire into the privileged circle of the European Concert in Paris in 1856, the new concept 
was in a way upgraded, if only because from then the concepts of "European" or "Christian" 
were no longer applicable. By the same token the new concept suitably expressed both the gene-
rally felt superiority of the European tradition and its independence from religious connotations. 
It will come as no surprise that Martens' professor at Heidelberg, Bluntschli, had been pivotal in 
coining the idea. In his Das moderne Volkerrecht der civilisirten Staten als Rechtsbuch darge-
stellt (1868) he voiced both the idea of the Commonwealth of Man and the missionary role, if 
not sacred duty, of the European nations "vor den andern Volker die Trager und Schirmer des 
Volkerrecht zu sein".47 In a both epochal and controversial article in the Revue of 1884 James 
Lorimer was to divide the world in a humanite civilisee, humanite (a demi) barbare, and huma-
nite sauvage.48 Around the turn of the century, Otto Nippold was perhaps the first to firmly 
abjure this idea of 'civilisation" and instead apply a proper legal norm as criterion for entrance 
into the Volkerrechtsgemeinschaft as a subject of international law, this criterion being the 
verification of an actor as a sovereign state 49 In 1905, Oppenheim would define "civilised" as 
enabling a State and its subjects "to understand and act in conformity with the principles of the 
Law of Nations".50 
4 5 ' See e.g. Geffken's censure in 16 RDILC (1884) at 104. 
4 6 , Pustogarov 2000 at 50-56. Interestingly enough, the French translation does not bear this reference to nations 
civilisees. 
4 7 ' Bluntschli 1868 at 55. References taken from Rhea Schircks, Die Martens 'sche Klausel 2001, notably at 81 -96. 
4 8 ' In 16 RDILC 1884 at 335ff. 
4 9 ' Nippold, "Geltungsgebiet", in: ZVB 1908 II441-472, at 453. 
5 0- Oppenheim, Int. Law 1905 at 31. 
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In the ongoing debate of the 1870s Martens' must have struggled with the idea. The title-page of 
the French translation of his work does not feature the "civilised nations"-colon. By the same 
token, its preface refers to "nations civilisees ou chretiennes".51 However, Martens' proposition 
rings true in that it, once more, defines the macro-cosmos of the Society of States according to 
the same criteria which are applied by him to the micro-cosmos of the domestic sphere: [die] 
"Gemeinsamkeit der socialen, culturellen und rechtlichen Interessen der durch sie verbundenen 
civilisirten Nationen".52 Meanwhile, in his treatise La paix et la guerre of 1901, Martens refers to 
"l'opinion publique du monde civilise" and "nations civilisees" on almost every page.53 
If, according to Martens, the Law of Nations in the proper sense remained reserved to the civi-
lised nations, their relations with the uncivilised nations, peoples, or tribes were determined, if 
only for lack of the above-mentioned "common interests", by the dictates of natural law and the 
"gewisse Grundsatze, welche aus der sittlichen Natur und Vernunft des Menschen entsprin-
gen".5 4 A review of Martens' references, and notably of his chapter on the Geltungsgebiet des 
Volkerrechts55, reveals, as was rightly pointed out by Schircks56, that Martens' concept of 'civi-
lised nations', as with Bluntschli, was still an essentially cultural, not an exclusively or primarily 
legal concept: "Das moderne Volkerrecht ist ein Product des Culturlebens und Rechtsbewusst-
seins der Nationen europaischer Civilisation."57 In this appreciation of Martens', religion played 
a pivotal role, as is revealed not just by his emphasising the role of the Christian religion, but 
notably by his factual exclusion of the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the "entwicklungshemmen-
CO 
de" doctrine of Islam. Even more interesting perhaps, in view of the above, is Martens'firm 
disagreement with Bluntschli's idealism and his teacher's extension of the sphere of positive 
international law to all nations, as being a negation of the legal principle of reciprocity. Martens' 
verdict here is unequivocal: 
... solch' edler und erhabener Kosmopolitismus entzieht dem Volkerrecht alien realen Boden 
und jede praktische Bedeutung, er verwandelt das Volkerrecht in ein Gespinnst idealer, aber, 
wenigstens unter den gegenwartigen Verhaltnissen, unrealisirbarer Rechtsnormen."59 
5L Martens Traite I at 2ff. Cf Schircks 2001 at 90, n. 439. 
52' Volkerrecht I at ix. 
5 3 ' The Preface is most illustrative in this respect. 
54' Volkerrecht, I at 182. 
S5' Volkerrecht I at 181-184. 
5 6 - Schircks 2002 at 88-92. 
57' Volkerrecht I at 181. 
S 8 ' Martens terms are categorical:"absolut keine Moglichkeit"; Volkerrecht I at 181. 
59' Volkerrecht I at 184. 
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It is with these concepts in mind that Martens entered debate at the Hague Peace Conferences. 
They were perhaps not entirely consistent and altogether convincing. As stipulated above, Mar-
tens at the end of the day was not the theoretician.60 He did not elaborate these views in any 
appreciably comprehensive form later on. What he did produce was a number of contributions to 
the Revue on mostly topical and delicate issues of contemporary international relations. These 
articles gave rise to the embarrassing polemics with Westlake, Holland, Lammasch, Danewski 
and others.61 If signed by the law professor they were generally deemed the work of the coun-
cillor of the Foreign Ministry and a downright apology of Russian policy only tarnished by the 
academic varnish. The topics in themselves would indeed suggest some truth in this criticism.62 
II. Martens' involvement with the Hague Tradition 
1. The First Hague Peace Conference of 18996 3 
Matters of Preparation and Organization 
Martens simply loved Holland. On more than one occasion during the Peace Conferences, so as 
to persuade wavering diplomats in taking bold steps, he referred to the brave mentality of the 
Dutch. They had not complacently idled behind their dunes, but had ventured onto the high seas. 
By throwing up dams to check the waters, they had survived against all odds. He loved inserting 
allusions to their rich cultural tradition, or to draw attention to that genius who stood at the cradle 
of international law. He felt warmth and sympathy to this native soil of Erasmus, the nation that 
had advised Peter the Great in building his Baltic fleet, and had embraced Anna Pavlovna as its 
6 0- Cf. Kamarovsky in 23 AIDI (1910) 538-43 at 542-43: Martens was primarily "historien et diplomate" [...] "les 
questions abstraites ou de pure theorie ne l'attirent que faiblement. II professait pour les reformes de droit et de 
la vie internationale un certain scepticisme qui caracterise les hommes de la pratique." 
6L Nussbaum 1952 at 56ff. V.P. Danewski, La Russie et I'Angleterre dans I'Asie centrale. Observations critiques 
sur ... F. Martens 1881, which attacked Martens' theory of treaty violation by England. On the same issue Mar-
tens crossed swords with Westlake in lengthy articles in 12 RDILC (1880). 
6 2 ' The articles concerned issues such as "Consuls and Consular Jurisdisction in the Orient", 1873 (diss, in Russian; 
German transl. 1874); "The Eastern War and the Brussels Conference", 1878 (in Russian; French transl. 1901); 
"La Russie et I'Angleterre dans I'Asie centrale", 1879 (transl. in Russian, German, and English); "Le conflit 
entre la Russie et la Chine, ses origines, son developpement et sa portee universelle", 1880 (transl. in Russian 
and German); "La question egyptienne et le droit international", 1882; "Memoire sur le telegraphe en Chine", 
1883; "La conference du Congo a Berlin, et la politique coloniale des etats modernes", 1886; "Memoire sur 
l'affaire Zappa", 1893. 
6 3 ' On Martens' stay in The Hague in 1899 see Martens'treatises La conference de lapaix a la Haye 1901; Lapaix 
et la guerre 1901 (orig, in Russian); Par la justice vers la paix 1907. Also Pustogarov 2000 at 157-93, and 
Eyffinger, The 1899 Hague Peace Conference 1999 passim. 
32 
Feodor Martens, Architect of the Hague Tradition of International Law 
Queen.64 In appreciating this, one must call to mind that Martens was a native from Estonia, like 
Holland a humble nation along the seashore and wedged between great powers all around. He 
was born in Parnu, a small but time-honoured Hansa town. Inevitably, Martens must have felt 
akin to the Dutch. Well before 1899, Martens had repeatedly applied to his Ministry to be made 
envoy to The Hague. 
Martens' first actual visit to Holland had been occasioned by Tobias Asser's Hague Conferences 
on Private International Law of 1893 and 1894. By that time, Martens and Asser had already 
become tried and trusted friends through their meetings at the Institut. With Renault they were to 
constitute a kind of Triumvirate to enhance the Hague tradition.65 In 1893, Martens had been 
favourably struck by the quiet overall climate and Asser's competent organisation of the Confe-
rence. In the opening weeks of 1899 the issue of the venue for the Peace Conference still remai-
ned to be settled. By then, all major capitals of Europe had eliminated each other. With Scandi-
navia disinterested, Switzerland in the grip of anarchism, and the keen aspirations of the Belgian 
king effectively blocked by Parliament, it was Martens who, to his superiors' eminent relief, 
suggested The Hague as venue and, at the top of his head, added a dozen good arguments to 
strengthen its candidature. The Hague tradition of internationalism was launched that very day.6 6 
Undoubtedly, the 1899 Peace Conference was Martens' finest hour. In the strength of his years, 
he availed himself optimally of all the experience gathered over previous decades in the domes-
tic and international arenas: as a weather-beaten diplomat, a consummate lawyer, and a seasoned 
arbitrator. To be sure, his position was never easy. The summer of 1899 was to prove the ulti-
mate test, both physically and mentally, to his seemingly inexhaustible sources of energy and 
willpower. The preparatory months were an ordeal, but in the end Martens drew endless joy from 
the intellectual and social rewards they rendered. 
64 Eyffinger 1999 at 408: "Concord": "Consider for a moment the example offered us by this small and charming 
country whose guests we are. Why has Holland played so great a part in history? Why have her commerce and 
her ships spread over all the oceans? It is because the Dutch have not remained behind their dunes; they have 
climbed to the top of those dunes and breathed in the air of the sea. [...] let us follow that country's example: let 
us climb to the top of our dunes and direct our gaze upon a broader horizon. [...] The barriers of prejudice must 
fall, and then we shall see a spirit of understanding and of mutual confidence in dealing with all questions. 
Concord, gentlemen, should be the watchword and the aim of our labours." Scott Proceedings at 641-42. See 
also Martens, La Conference de la paix a la Haye 1900 at lOff. 
6 5 ' Asser may be called the architect of the Hague tradition in the sphere of private international law. He was the 
founder of the Hague Conference of 1893. Along with his dear friend Renault he was the founding father of the 
Hague Academy, which was inaugurated in 1923. 
6 6 ' The decision to select The Hague as venue for the Conference was the outcome of a long process of elimination. 
The considerations put forward traditionally such as the references to Grotius, the rich parliamentarity tradition 
of the Dutch, its time-honoured neutrality, the links between the Romanovs and the House of Orange through 
Anna Pavlovna, and its ready accessibility were mere afterthoughts mostly. Vexing issues of the invitation 
policy, such as the attendance of the Holy See, played their role. By all accounts, it was Martens who first sug-
gested The Hague. See Lysen 1934 at 76 with reference to correspondence between Asser and Martens; also 
Eyffinger 1999 at 70ff., and Martens, La Conference de la paix a la Haye 1900 at lOff. 
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As with so many, the Czar's Rescript had fallen on him 'as snow on his head' at his estate in 
Livonia.67 However, soon enough he was summoned to the capital. Knowing foreign minister 
Muraviev all too well, Martens duly anticipated that the convocation had not been based on any 
serious preparation. The drafting of the Programme was predictably left to him. Faced with 
vaccillation and flippancy all around, in the midst of disinterest and disrespect, he set out on a 
labour of love. Anticipating imminent failure in the sphere of disarmament, he first bent empha-
sis towards the gradual reduction of the steady increase of armaments, then entwined his own 
hobby-horse into the Programme, to wit, humanitarian issues in the Brussels tradition, and final-
ly elaborated the insertion of the concept of peaceful settlement of disputes. In short, the 1899 
programme was his, and no one else's. If he is to blame for its shortcomings, he is at least partly 
excused by circumstance, and he deserves all the credit for its merits. 
Once in The Hague, Martens, from day one assiduously supported the helpless De Staal, both in 
matters of substance and protocol. In day to day practice he acted as his nation's first delegate, 
much to the resentment of colleagues such as De Basily, who was to play some nice little tricks 
on him. Given his authority as the champion of the 1874 Brussels declaration, Martens was the 
only natural chairman of the Second Commission on the laws and customs of war. Still, no less 
prominent was his voice in the debate of the celebrated Comite d'examen of the Third Commis-
sion, whose efforts resulted in the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
Martens' self-assuredness and authority in The Hague can be distilled from his various formal 
addresses, speeches and interventions which, amid his other works, stand out as gems of rhetoric, 
persuasion, and will-power.68 Clearly, he felt at ease. In a short tract on the history of this "Par-
liament of Man" he permits us wonderful insights into the daily affairs of the Conference, inclu-
ding an impression of the lavish 17th century decorations of the Orange Room, venue of the 
"Hundred Chosen", at the Huis ten Bosch palace.69 Martens impressed his colleagues on many 
accounts: by his excellent command of languages, his visionary thoughts as compared to the 
narrow-mindedness of so many colleagues, and above all by his unwavering quest for compro-
mise. So much so indeed that fellow-lawyers at times resented his insistence on concord at the 
cost of what they thought legal scrutiny. Clearly, with Martens, at the end of the day, it was the 
diplomat who prevailed at The Hague. To him, at the conference table, international law was 
instrumental to the pragmatism of international relations. A legal gem of a convention, if not 
6 7 ' Pustogarov 2000 at 158. 
6 8 ' See Eyffinger 1999 at 298: 'The vital interests..."; ibid, at 379: "Martens Declaration"; and notably at 403: "To 
the rescue of arbitration". 
6 9 ' Martens, La Conference 1900 at 13-15. 
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backed by the nations, was to remain a dead letter. In this, the Trauma of Brussels must have 
played a dominant role. Repetition of the rude awakening he had experienced 25 years earlier, 
when round after round of non-committal discourse and theoretical speculation had finally left 
him virtually empty-handed, should be prevented at all costs. 
Martens' role in the concluding of the 1899 Conventions cannot possibly be over-estimated. It 
was his versatility, dexterity, persuasion and willpower which in the end carried the day.7 0 They 
saved this first ever intergovernmental debate on most of the outstanding socio-political issues of 
the day from remaining "trashing out Russian straw"71 or turn out a mere "footnote in the history 
of mankind" as Mommsen and so many others had predicted.72 For all the censure on the 
Conference, Martens, for one, on perusing its results was extremely pleased and actually sur-
prised. From day one he had argued that putting heikel issues on the agenda was meant simply to 
sound out the positions of the Governments in a first exploring round of debate, not necessarily 
to solve all riddles. He had cherished no illusions whatsoever as to disarmament, but had appre-
ciated its inclusion in the programme and its free discussion, if only as a token of goodwill to the 
demands of the outside world. For him, from the beginning, the 1899 conference was merely the 
first in a series, "the beginning, not the end".73 In fact, as he argued at The Hague, the concept of 
the Conference should be quickly institutionalised. He therefore readily deferred inconclusive 
issues to its anticipated sequel. 
Humanitarian issues: the Martens Clause 
Meanwhile, Martens' personal triumphs at The Hague were numerous. First of all, and much to 
his relief and satisfaction, his upgraded version of his 1874 Brussels declaration passed virtually 
unscathed. The intrinsic value of the 1899 (and 1907) humanitarian conventions has only dee-
pened with time. Over the past decade, we have come to reappraise their merits as a major step-
ping-stone on that long and winding road which brought the nations to Leipzig, Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, then along the Yugoslav and Rwanda crises to Rome, finally to settle down at ICC 
Headquarters in The Hague. It was Martens who first put these issues on the agenda. In 1899, 
Martens' pioneering and conciliatory role in this domain was appreciated with a thunderous app-
lause by the Plenary.74 
7 0 ' Cf. Wehberg 1910 at 350: "..tiber die Inkonsequenz seiner Ideen meist durch die Kraft und Ueberzeugung..." 
under reference to Merignhac's estimate: "une dialectique vive et puissante". 
7L Cf. Zorn in: Deutsche Rundschau January 1900, and Scott Proceedings at 136. 
7 2 - See Eyffinger 1999 at 204. 
7 3 ' Taken from the opening address of the Russian First Delegate De Staal. See Eyffinger in UN Decade Int. Law; 
Centennial First Int. Peace Conf. At bthe Peace Palace, The Hague 1999. 
97' Scott Proceedings at 549. 
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And then of course, there was this moment on June 20, which saw the formulating of the so-
called Martens Clause, aptly described by Cassese as "one of the contemporary myths of the 
international community".75 Was it a historic moment? Recently, the Clause has been subjected 
to in-depth scrutiny from various angles, and this on solid grounds. It would seem as if, over the 
decades, the formula has gradually gained the status of mantra to be invoked by courts and 
councils indiscriminately as a convenient safety-valve with no specific import. The recent appeal 
to this magic formula in various cases before ICJ and ICTY and its diverging interpretation on 
these occasions, urgently required a thorough scrutiny as to its origin and author's intention. 
Cassese, in an eminently lucid analysis of a century of case-law, state practice, and legal literatu-
re has, through terse reasoning, evaluated the manifold threads to be distinguished: its downgra-
ding as a formula of strictly moral and political value, self-evident and therefore pointless from 
the viewpoint of law; its appreciation as a major source of inspiration to the development of 
international humanitarian law as such; its upgrading into a general interpretative guideline in 
that domain; its interpretation as at least excluding the e contrario argument; finally, the trend to 
assign to the Clause a veritable norm-creating character, a historic juncture in the history of the 
discipline, when two new sources of international law saw the light. Quite recently, Schircks has 
thoroughly reviewed the Clause from its linguistic, historical and teleological aspects and by in-
depth research has evaluated its various constituting elements of "usages etablis", "nations civili-
sees", "lois de Phumanite" and "conscience publique". 
The outcome of this multi-faceted research, needless to say, has not been unequivocal. This in 
itself is not dramatic. Arguably, the mere fact that, apparently, the author's intention of the 
Clause is no longer historically identifiable should not ipso facto hamper its role in the organic 
development of the law, that is, as long as its application is meaningful, consistent and relevant. 
To that extent, one may refer to the distinction applied by modern linguistics between meaning 
and significance,77 Major tenets propounded by Grotius have, in the course of time, remained of 
distinct value for successive generations precisely by virtue of their re-interpretation and extra-
polation. On the other hand, a durable lack of consistency in terms of reference in State practice, 
learned commentaries and rulings by some of the highest judicial organs in the world will turn 
the Clause into an ever less reliable, indeed less innocent instrument. 
7 5 ' Cassese, in; 11 EJIL (2000) at 187. 
76' Ibid, at 202ff. with references to the Klinge case (1956), the Krupp case (1948), the ICJ Corfu Channel case 
(1949), the Brussels K. W. case (1950), the ICJ Military and Paramilitary Actions case (1986), a Colombian 
Constit. Crt case (1995), the ICTY Martic decision (1996), and the ICJ Legality... Nuclear Weapons case (1996). 
Cf. also Schircks 2001 notably at 3Iff. (ICJ) and 55ff.(ICTY). 
7 7'' See e.g. Hirsch, Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted, in: 11 Critical Inquiry, Dec. 1984. 
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Clearly, this is not the place to reopen this complex ongoing debate. Still, a few casual remarks 
on the side may perhaps be permitted. All too readily perhaps the Clause is being dismissed in 
literature as, to use Cassese's phraseology, a mere "diplomatic gimmick" and a typical formula 
of compromise, and emphasis laid on its being intrinsically, if not deliberately "vague", "evasi-
ve", "ambiguous", or at least "very loosely worded". From this perspective, it may be worth-
while to once more call to mind the historical context. 
Martens, it has been stipulated before, entered debate in The Hague still heavily burdened with 
the frustrating experience of 1874. The never ratified Brussels Declaration had been his brain-
child all along. During the previous quarter of a century, he himself had been the most persistent 
advocate of its substance matter. Actually, it was Martens who had inserted the issues in the 
Conference Programme in the first place. In June 1899 he was the obvious candidate to chair the 
Second Commission and notably that Commission's second sub-commission, which dealt with 
these issues. Within this latter expert body, in the course of the first two weeks of debate, harmo-
ny had prevailed throughout and all went smoothly. This in itself was no surprise, as in the arran-
gement of articles the Commission had deliberately postponed the most vexing issues to the 
last.78 
Then, on June 6, at the opening of its sixth meeting, and with "three-fourths finished"79, the sub-
commission had reached the last remaining issues80, which dealt with the status of belligerents 
and the relations between combatants and non-combatants.81 "Sur le champ" the Belgian dele-
gate Beernaert took the floor to raise substantial objections, both of a general and wider nature82 
and more in particular against what in Martens' view8 3 was the core of the proposed Convention, 
the articles 9 and 10. These defined the status of belligerents and the reciprocal rights and duties 
of the invading forces vis-a-vis defending levies and the population. 
The drift of Beernaert's tenets was the following. Imbued with the best of humanitarian conside-
rations no doubt, delegates in 1874 had intended to reduce the evils of war for the harmless 
population of invaded countries. However, in order to accomplish this goal and minimize civil 
78' Cf. the phrasing in the Rapport by Rolin: "Get ordre des discussions, destine a reserver pour la fin les questions 
les plus delicates." 
7 9 ' The words of Beernaert; Scott Proceedings at 502. 
8 0 ' The Chapters 1, 2 and 9 of the 1874 project. 
8 1 ' Point 10 on the Agenda, articles 9-11 which, due to a later rearrangement of the project proposed by the Comite 
de Redaction became the articles 1 and 2 of the Reglement. 
' Beernaert actually suggested to drop six articles: 3-5, 40-42, to carefully rephrase 2, 6, 9-11, and to insert two 
new articles conditioning the levying of taxes by conquerors and requisition in kind. We will focus on the discus-
sion regarding art. 9-10 exclusively. 
8 3 ' As expressed explicitly and repeatedly in the meetings of June 6 and 20. 
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unrest the invaded country was advised to acknowledge in limine all rights and claims to its 
territory advanced by the invader; in similar vein, its population was ordered to abstain from 
participating in the war. It was then to be left to the invader either to apply or emendate the up to 
then prevailing laws, or introduce legislation of its own. Beernaert did not deny that it had been 
the acknowledged practice from times immemorial for invaders to impose their laws on invaded 
countries by sheer force. However, it was something different to have this procedure legitimated 
by Convention. This would "turn fact and force into right" and "in advance legitimate the use of 
force, and recognize as law" what should be left to a subsequent peace conference to decide. But, 
above all, this was militating against all moral notions and the very idea of patriotism. The first 
duty of a citizen was to defend his country, to which "we all owe the most beautiful pages of our 
national history". 
Also, in Beernaert's view, the proposed articles ran to the exclusive benefit of the great powers, 
which never incurred similar risks at the hands of the small. As for Belgium - the wiser from the 
lessons of history and appreciating its delicate geographical situation - this country was an 
acknowledged neutral nation; the great Powers had pledged themselves by treaty never to invade 
her.8 5 For all these reasons he felt it was much better to leave the substance matter of the articles 
9-10 to "the domain of the law of nations, however vague it may be." "Moderation" on the part 
of the conqueror was all that was needed. Or, as he put it later with respect to acts of heroism by 
individuals: "There are certain points which cannot be the subject of a convention and which it 
would be better to leave, as at present, under the governance of that tacit and common law which 
arises from the principles of the law of nations" and... "that incessant progress of ideas". 
[italics added] 
Beernaert's stand in itself must not have come as a complete surprise to Martens. These were the 
very articles that had caused the undoing of the Brussels Declaration in 1874, as was readily ad-
mitted by Beernaert himself.86 Still, Martens could not but look upon the intervention as a 
booby-trap undermining the whole undertaking: the Brussels nightmare revived by the Belgians 
of all people! Actually, Beernaert was well aware of this. The gist of his tenets was precisely, as 
he coined it, to prevent incurring "the same difficulties as before". 
Martens' reply came immediate. It was to the point, consistent, and eminently eloquent, and it 
can be summed up under the heading "Cui bono? " Who were indeed the ones to profit from lea-
8 4 ' Scott Proceedings at 503; Eyffinger 1999 at 296. 
8 5 , Beernaert's address is most intriguing in the perspective of events fifteen years later. 
92' Scott Proceedings at 533. 
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ving these issues "in a vague state and in the exclusive domain of the law of nations"? [italics 
added] "Do the weak become stronger because the duties of the strong are not defined? Do the 
strong become weaker because their rights are specially defined and consequently limited? I do 
not think so. In the midst of combat the more noble sentiments of the human heart very often 
remain a closed book." If there were laws of war, Martens argued, one must determine them. 
Commanders and armies should be given very strict instructions. This was what the proposed 
Convention was all about. The outbreak of wars could not be prevented, therefore armies should 
not just be provided with the best weapons, "but also be imbued with the notions of right, justice, 
and humanity, binding even in an invaded territory and even in regard to the enemy." The 
Brussels Declaration should in fact be an Act of Education. If delegates failed a second time now 
0 7 
after Brussels , this added up to giving free rein to licence, and numerous would be the ones to 
avail themselves of this state of affairs. 
One aspect of Martens' speech should be stressed here at the outset: "it would be a pity to leave 
in a vague condition" . .."leaving utter vagueness for all these questions" ... in a state of vague-
ness and in the domain of the law of nations"... to leave uncertainty hovering over these 
questions". Martens' peroratio read:' It is for you to answer the question: to whom will doubt 
and uncertainty be of advantage, to the weak or to the strong?" Vagueness was indeed the last 
thing Martens had in mind. Nor was his position that of reaching a vain compromise. 
On June 10, in the eighth meeting, a new bomb was planted, this time by the British delegate, Sir 
John Ardagh. As in 1874 (he observed laconically) his government was prepared to accept the 
range of articles as a non-committal set of instructions, to be applied, modified, or abandoned at 
discretion, but would - at least in his private opinion (!) - certainly not bind itself to a Conven-

tion. Martens must have seen Lord Derby wink from the grave, the British delegate who, in 
1874, had been instructed not to commit himself at the conference table and had stuck to that 
literally by not uttering a single word for days on end.8 9 
Once more, Martens personally intervened. There could be no question of non-commitment or 
modification at will. Regulations between contracting and acceding parties needed to be uniform 
and binding. It was on this occasion that he made his well-known comparison with mutual 
insurance association". With the abuses of military force it was as with devastating fire or hail, 
no one would welcome their occurrence, but still their occurrence was undeniable. One was free 
8 7 ' He could have added: "after all these meetings of the Institut, the work of Moynier, and the Oxford Manual...." 
8 8 , Scott Proceedings at 517. 
8 9 ' See La paix et la guerre 1901 at 109. 
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to accept the Association's Statutes or not, but its terms were binding. This Convention was 
meant to warrant the interests of the population against the worst disasters. It did not legitimate 
these disasters, but simply took the existing danger for a fact. Martens was no fool: "None of [the 
draft] articles sanctions the disasters of war which do and always will exist. What the provisions 
have in view is to bear relief to peaceful and unarmed populations during the calamities of war." 90 
On June 12, the commission returned to Beernaert's objections. The core of the matter was, as 
Baron Rolin would later put it concisely in his Rapport: 
De savoir si la crainte de paraitre consacrer comme un droit, dans un reglement international, le 
pouvoir de fait qui s'exerce par la force des armes, doit faire abandonner le precieux avantage 
d'une limitation de ce pouvoir.91 
Being forced by law to automatic compliance with the law imposed by the invading army for the 
sake of civil order and in order to prevent unnecessary suffering, was identical to acknowledging 
as right what was a mere fact of force. Beernaert only wished to adopt dispositions which ac-
cepted the fact of conquest but not the right of the conqueror, all this conditional to its entailing 
specific obligations to invading armies so as to warrant moderation of their force. Otherwise he 
much preferred to leave the unlimited rights of the defendant untouched. 
To this Martens riposted that it was absolutely necessary not to surrender the vital interests of 
peaceful and unarmed populations to the hazards of war and international law. No member of the 
sub-commission wished to see legal authorities of the invaded country sanction factual power in 
advance. By the same token, the adoption of the strictest regulations to put limits to the exercise 
of power was generally felt to be in the interest of all nations. In fact two irreconcilable view-
points were advanced. Martens despaired - momentarily. It seemed as if there was no alternative 
left but to leave "to the progress of civilization and to the humanitarian sentiments of heads of 
armies the task of looking after the interests of the inhabitants."92 
But then, on June 20, in the eleventh meeting, he had gathered enough strength to embark upon a 
formal declaration. He once more summarised the debate, while stressing the extreme impor-
tance of the articles 9 and 10. They had the "sublime objective" of embodying the sacred duty of 
governments to diminish the evils and calamities of war. If the right of self-defence of the 
9 0 ' Scott Proceedings at 518. In this meeting the Dutch delegate Van Karnebeek spoke of "a patriotic duty of the 
highest importance to remain to the end the most determined and resolute opponents and enemies of the inva-
der."; Scott Proceedings at 521. The German Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff s interventions are likewise worth 
noticing. 
9 1 ' Cf. Scott Proceedings at 418. 
9 2 ' Scott Proceedings at 533. 
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population was sacred, so was the duty of governments not to sacrifice unnecessary victims in 
the interest of the war. For this reason the forces of the defence should be organised and discipli-
ned. The Brussels code was meant to afford the population more guarantees, not to set limits to 
patriotism. Spontaneous acts as by individuals could never be anticipated. Heroes were not 
created by codes, their only code was their self-abnegation, their will and their patriotism. They 
were in fact above the code. 
Martens then proposed to have inserted into the proces-verbal a Declaration to the following 
effect. The Conference was unanimous in advocating the definition and regulation of the usages 
of war and in that spirit had adopted a great number of provisions. Still, a perfectly complete 
code was as yet unattainable. On the other hand, the Conference did not wish to leave eventuali-
ties not anticipated or covered by the written code to the discretion of the commanders of armies. 
Therefore - followed the "Clause". 
Beernaert's reaction was immediate. While the articles 9-10 did not quite corrrespond to what he 
had hoped for, he now felt satisfied to subscribe to them "en raison de la declaration que vient de 
faire M. le President".93 He emphasised the importance of the Declaration and insisted on its 
inclusion into the official documents of the Conference.94 He also drew the conclusions from it 
that "armies, militia, organized bodies, and also the population which, even though unorganized, 
spontaneously takes up arms in unoccupied territory, must be regarded as belligerents." All 
eventualities not provided for in the Convention ""sont regies par le droit des gens dans les 
termes de la declaration que vient de lire le President, [italics added].95 His subsequent obser-
vation was also remarkable: "Mais ce sont la des regies et nul ne les a mieux tracees qu'un autre 
de Martens, qui a ete, lui aussi, l'honneur de son pays." None had outlined these rules better than 
another Martens, who had also been an honour to his country. "To-morrow as today the rights of 
the victor, far from being unlimited, will be restricted by the laws of the universal conscience 96 
and no nation, no general would dare violate them for he would thereby place himself under the 
ban of civilized nations."91 [italics added] 
93' Ibid, at 548. 
9 4 ' Whether the proces-verbal of the meeting, the final protocol or the General Act of the Conference. 
9 5 ' Scott Proceedings at 548-49. 
9 6 ' In his La paix et la guerre (at xi) Martens insists on the importance of closely watching the abiding of the 
Convention, which in his opinion "contribuera assuremant beaucoup au developpement de la conscience juridi-
que des nations et des gouvernements". 
9 7 ' Scott Proceedings at 549. 
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Then another incident occurred. The Swiss colonel Kiinzli launched an emotional appeal on the 
commission not to "punish love of country".98 He wished the whole chapter of the draft Conven-
tion as well as the British proposition of non-commitment put to the vote as a whole. To this 
Martens replied that an article by article deliberation seemed necessary, "metis son expose et sa 
declaration se rattachent a I'ensemble des articles 9 et 10 qui sont etroitement unis." [italics 
added] What followed was a prolonged discussion on the British proposition. Finally this was 
withdrawn but only, and precisely because it was felt by the majority to have become redundant 
by Martens' declaration and conditionally, as the French delegate Bourgeois insisted, on the 
explicit inclusion of this Clause into the official documents of the Conference.99 On this footing 
agreement was reached. 
On July 5, the draft text was without much debate accepted by the plenary of the Second Com-
mission: Martens' phrasing "un code tout a fait complet" was replaced with "plus complet"100 
[italics added]. On July 27 Martens' Declaration was accepted by the Plenary of the Conference 
as a peroratio to the Preamble of the Convention, which stipulated that it applied notably [italics 
added] to the articles 1 and 2 of the Reglement, which were identical to the articles 9 and 10 as 
discussed within the body of the second sub-commission. On June 20 Martens wrote in his diary: 
"I myself did not expect such a brilliant success. The Brussels Declaration - my beloved child -
has been adopted."101 In an article in the North American Review of November 1899 he stated: 
"The treaty on the laws and customs of war will certainly be as notable as the treaty on 
arbitration."102 He had but one regret, as he confessed in February 1903 in his Preface to 
Merignhac's commentary on the Convention: "...nous avons commis une grande faute en 
n'insistant pas sur la necessite de fixer un terme precis pour la mise a execution de l'engagement 
pris." Three years after The Hague, few were the Governments that had complied with "cet 
engagement d'honneur" to implement the Reglement in the instructions for their armies and have 
these published.103 
What are the conclusions one may draw from the above? 
1. The Clause was developed within the context of a debate on very specific issues of huma-
nitarian law, these being the later articles 1 and 2 of the 1899 Regulations. 
9 8 ' Scott Proceedings at 550-51. 
"• Ibid, at 553-54. 
1 0 0 ' At the request of delegates Bildt and Nigra. Scott Proceedings at 415-18. 
1 0 L Cited from Pustogarov 2000 at 178. 
1 0 2 ' Cf. Holls Peace Conference 1908 at 161-62. 
1 0 3 ' Merignhac, Les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, 1903, Preface viii. 
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2. Although in itself applicable to all articles of the Regulations annexed to the Convention, 
the Clause was aimed specifically for these articles. This can be concluded from its 
consistent interpretation by Martens himself, Beernaert, Rolin, and the text of the Preamble. 
3. The Clause was decisive in having the above-mentioned articles adopted unanimously; 
Beernaert's reaction and the debate regarding the British proposition make this unequivocal. 
Adoption of these articles constituted the major leap ahead as compared to (Paris 1856, 
Geneva 1864, St. Petersburg 1868, and) Brussels 1874. In historical perspective this was 
perhaps the paramount role of the Clause. 
4. Meanwhile, its substance addressed specifically those issues that could not be comprehen-
ded in the advanced Regulations. In the debate of 1899 the legal issues at stake were never 
solved completely within the terms of Convention and Regulations. It was the "non liquet" 
which inspired and was covered by the Clause. 
5. In doing so, it filled a vacuum between international humanitarian law as codified in the 
Convention and Regulations, and the arbitrariness of the "victor's law" (the e contrario ele-
ment) 
6. It did so with reference to the principles of the law of nations. 
7. Although therefore applicable to international humanitarian law, its references did not cons-
titute part of that law, but of general international law. 
8. Being clearly inspired by considerations of charity and humanity, the Martens Clause is an 
instrument bearing a distinct legal basis and character. 
9. The Martens Clause was nothing new, but simply recalled well-established principles of 
international law. The following considerations may suggest this interpretation: 
• Martens never claimed the "Clause" as his own, neither in later publications or private 
correspondence. 
• Beernaert immediately accepted the Clause as relying on the solid basis of well-estab-
lished principles. His reference to Georg Martens, if he is indeed the Martens referred to 
here, leaves no doubt on that point whatsoever.104 
1 0 4 ' This author has not been able to verify any clear-cut reference to this specific formula in the work of Georg 
Martens. Martens of course distinguishes between the "obligations parfaites" of positive law and the "obligations 
imparfaites" created by the loi naturelle (see Les Fondateurs du droit international 1904 at 605ff.). His Precis de 
droit des Gens, in its Introduction, contains numerous references to morale naturelle, raison naturelle on the one 
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• Rolin's Report does not voice any surprise, nor does it refer to any debate. It is extremely 
unlikely that a body of lawyers including prominent Membres of the Institut (Lammasch, 
Nigra, Rolin, Renault, Descamps, Stancioff etc.) who through the efforts of the Institut, no-
tably the Oxford Manual, were well versed in the substance-matter, whould have accepted 
the introduction of any "new sources of law" without any comment. 
To conclude: the Clause is not vague or elusive. It was designed as a very efficient instrument to 
bridge the gap between the stipulations of Convention and Regulations and prevailing arbitrari-
ness with regard to certain issues that could not possibly be covered by the former but required 
protection from the latter. The Clause was not a "diplomatic gimmick" and only to a very limited 
extent a "compromise". It did not import the issues at stake into the Convention and Regulations, 
it did not affect the Convention and Regulations, but offered the maximum of legal warrant sub-
sidiary to these. 
An interesting parallel to the considerations which prompted the Clause is perhaps found in 
Grotius' system of laws of war. Being faced with the harshness and imperfection of the positive 
code of his day and age, and while accepting this inevitable state of affairs, Grotius insisted on 
the relevance of two aspects: first his doctrine of the so-called temperamenta, which called for a 
humanitarian approach whose terms he drew much stricter than the bottom-line of what went 
unpunished; and secondly on the sovereign notion of the interna iustitia, the precepts of moral 
justice. 
Even so, the question remains, what did Martens' references amount to in day-to-day practice of 
harsh political reality. Did he sell them "pie in the skye"? There is this old maxim taken from 
Cicero: "Clausulae inconsuetae semper inducunt suspicionem."105 In this case at least, they did 
not - but should they have? Professor Cassese's article carries a lot of wisdom to that extent. 
Arbitration 
If Martens' reputation in the world was confirmed by the 1899 proceedings, it was established 
well before that day, and actually on another title. His treaty series, his manual from the 1880s 
and his humanitarian efforts had earned him acclaim within the world of specialists. To the 
hand and the "consentement unanime des nations civilisees" on the other. As is put in the Introduction (ed. 1858 
I at 33: "Aux yeux de quelques publicistes, la difference entre la morale et le droit est une simple question de 
temps ou de culture humaine. Pour eux, le droit represente cette portion toujours croissante de la morale que la 
conscience publique juge actuellement applicable dans la societe et exigible au besoin par la contrainte. II y a 
erreur de leur part, la distinction n'est pas accidentelle mais permanente: elle repose sur des caracteres que le 
temps ne peut effacer." 
105. "Unusual clauses always excite suspicion." Cic. 3 Rep. 81. 
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world at large however his name had become known in the 1890s as a synonym to that of the 
great arbitrator. William Stead, the eloquent spokesman of his day, only epitomized Martens' 
fame in his famous epitheton "Chief Justice of the Christian World".1 0 6 In the last twenty years 
of his life Martens, along with Lammasch and Renault, was among the figures most in demand 
with nations in search of appeasing disputes in an amicable way. Apart from the cases recorded 
in literature, Martens was invited on many occasions as arbitrator or umpire in proceedings 
which either did not materialize or from which he was prevented to assist by distinct orders of 
his superiors. 1 0 7 Among these, incidentally, are ones from well beyond the Christian world. 
Meanwhile, the prominent ones are well-known: the 1891 Newfoundland dispute, the 1893 
Bering Sea case, the 1895 Costa Rica Packet dispute, and most of all the 1897-99 Orinoco 
case.1 0 8 To this last tribunal, already referred to above, Martens served as president. Hearings 
took place in Paris between June and September 1899, in the very midst of the Hague Peace 
Conference and his work on the Comite d'Examen, to which we will now turn. 
Obviously, Martens' decade of experience with arbitration panels made him a generally acknow-
ledged authority in the scholarly debate on the constitution of the Court of Arbitration. This is 
not to say that he represented the communis opinio among lawyers, far from it. In fact, if ever 
Martens disagreed with close colleagues from the Institut, it was perhaps in this area. Also, it is 
on these issues that he was least understood and incurred the most heated debate during both 
Peace Conferences. Again, this did not in the least affect his reputation at large. Martens cons-
tituted a school of his own, a minority opinion to be sure, but one that had to be reckoned with. 
The least one can say is that throughout these successive rounds of highly technical debate, and 
in the face of severe opposition, Martens expressed his views with almost untypical clearness 
and lucidity109, and demonstrated a consistency and pertinence one can only admire. 
What Martens had noticed over the past decade was a stealthy "relapse" into that old tradition of 
submitting disputes not to arbitration panels, but to heads of state, or the Holy See. Actually, in 
acknowledging defeat in the Italian political arena, Pope Leo XIII had, in past years, successfully 
106. ^ stead, in his The U.S. of Europe on the Eve of the Parliament of Peace. 1899 at p. 125 refers to Martens as 
"The Deputy Lord Chief Justice of Europe". 
1 0 7 ' As in the Franco-Siamese dispute of 1898, when Rolin-Jacquemyns, advisor to the King of Siam, approached 
Muraviev to have Martens appointed umpire, which request was turned down; cf. also the British dispute with 
Siam and Persia. See Pustogarov 2000 at 199. 
1 0 8 ' Pustogarov 2000 at 196ff. 
1 0 9 , In these respects, Martens was often compared unfavourably with his trusted friend Tobias Asser. See Wehberg 
1910 at 350: "Ueberhaupt fehlte es v. Martens mitunter an der notigen Klarheit, und vor allem auf den internatio-
nalen Privatrechtskonferenzen soli er neben der iiberlegenden Einsicht eines Asser, Kriege und Renault nicht 
haben bestehen konnen." 
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mustered all his allies to recapture moral prestige through this mechanism.110 It was precisely 
this claim which made it such a dilemma for the inviting powers, Russia and the Netherlands, to 
bar the Holy See from the Conference, even in the face of fierce Italian - and consequently 
German and Austrian - opposition to the High Pontiffs attendance.111 
Martens' was categorically opposed to any such relapse and the fervour of this conviction made 
him eloquent: heads of State as arbitrators were ipso facto "under no control and above all 
contestation".112 His otherwise amusing encounter with Czar Nicholas, referred to elsewhere in 
this volume113, is tale-telling for the views cherished in the complacent world at the European 
courts at the time. Martens primary goal therefore was to check this development and bend 
prodecure from the political towards the legal sphere. However, as he knew well enough that, 
wi th governments, for all the legal niceties, it was quid pro quo. At a fairly early stage he had 
concluded that in order to allure the nations into accepting the mechanism, he had to offer a 
package deal constituting a reasonable alternative. The concept of arbitration was to succeed 
only if it was tailor-made to the reality of international relations. Accordingly, Martens' absolute 
priority was to guarantee to the governments the perfect reliability and inviolability of the 
mechanism. It was meant to settle disputes for once and for all, and governments had to be sure 
to rely on this. Hence his focusing on the finality of awards and his militating against revision. 
The same held good for the reservations he entertained against the mandatory publication of the 
substantiation and train of reasoning leading up to the award, including the objections raised by 
dissenting arbitrators. In Martens' opinion, such a demand would easily narrow down the latitude 
of arbitrators and to that extent hamper compromise. Arbitrators, it should be understood, for all 
their legal learning, also represented their Governments and should not felt embarrassed on their 
return home. In this, Martens' views may well have been inspired by his own precarious position 
and experience. It would seem that his outspoken preference for having the Peace Conference 
proceed "a huis clos", that is, without media attendance, came from the awareness that exposure 
to the public would only unnecessarily restrain the latitude of delegates and affect the results of 
talks. Experience had made Martens a very pragmatic diplomat and many were the lawyers who 
found that hard to swallow. 
u 0 ' Reference is made to the German-Spanish conflict on the Carolines (1885)and the Brasil-Argentina dispute of 
1898. In 1896, and against the backdrop of the bilateral talks between Pauncefote and Olney, Leo himself had 
suggested the institution of international legal institutes. 
1 1 L On Leo XIII, his role as arbitrator and his views on the 1899 Conference see Eyffinger 1999 at 77-88. 
m- Scott Proceedings II326-27. 
1 1 3 ' Cf. contribution Judge Higgins. Cf. Pustogarov 2000 at 197-98. 
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Meanwhile, Martens' policy at The Hague with regard to arbitration was all his own. To him, the 
two major issues at stake, the constitution of a Court of Arbitration and rendering the mechanism 
obligatory were two parts of the same issue. Compulsory submittal and a binding verdict were 
the flip-sides of the same medal. Martens, typically enough, "wanted it all, and wanted it now". 
Once more, his angle of approach reveals not the legal technician, but the weather-beaten 
diplomat. On many accounts Martens did not reach his goal, such as in advocating the compul-
sory status of the mechanism. The institution of the PCA itself he considered a major triumph, 
especially after the prolonged crisis and trial. 
Last but not least we must briefly mention that other brainchild of Martens', the concept of 
Commissions of Inquiry. This mechanism he catapulted into the Committee, in his inimitable 
way, as a safety-valve in emergency situations, to cool-off emotions by factual examination. The 
reactions to this proposition varied to the extreme. The Romanian delegate Beldiman for one, 
"the eternal obstructionist" as he was typified by contemporary commentators, identified it as yet 
another tool at the hand of the major powers to influence, if not intervene into the domestic 
affairs of smaller nations. In this arena, however, Martens was to obtain an unqualified victory 
which, much to the surprise of sceptical commentators, soon afterwards turned out justified by 
events following the Doggers Bank incident (1904). 
In his final evaluation, Martens' deemed his mission at The Hague an almost unqualified suc-
cess. The more so as he trusted 1899 to be the first stage of a series of encounters. In 1907, 
Martens expected to reap a second harvest. It was on that occasion that he was to be desillusio-
ned. Still, he was right, that his achievements of 1899 were to be only the opening move of his 
enduring commitment to / 'Oeuvre de la Haye. 
2. The Permanent Court of Arbitration114 
Given Martens' prominence in 1899, it was small wonder indeed that, in 1900, he was among the 
first "Members" to be put on the list of the newly established Court of Arbitration. Little surprise 
either that he was elected on the bench of the first two cases submitted to that Court, the Pious 
Fund case of 1902 and the Preferential Claims case of 1904. Among his contemporaries, 
Martens' fame as an arbitrator was never questioned. As stipulated above, all this changed in 
1949 with the publication in the American Journal of incriminating recollections from a former 
1 I 4 ' Pustogarov 2000 at 195-216. 
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staff member of parties in the Orinoco case and subsequent allegations by Nussbaum.115 The 
incident is most regrettable. Not only were the charges of political intimidation and insincerity 
never corroborated by documents, they proved not verifiable in the archives. Child and Pusto-
garov who independently checked their national archives never unearthed any relevant source or 
document either damning or discharging its victim.1 1 6 Was it a non-issue? Clearly, the onus pro-
handi in this matter lies not with the defence. 
The Orinoco issue concerned the drawing of a boundary line, which was to be interpreted on the 
basis of, at least in legal terms controversial and hardly verifiable sixteenth century maps. Faced 
with four arbitrators who, not surprisingly, and pursuant to elaborate scholarly research, each of 
them submitted distinctly different propositions, Martens availed himself of his prerogative to 
draw up a line which, in his eyes at least, did justice to both parties. In this he succeeded incon-
testably as can be verified from many sources; both parties at the time were extremely pleased 
with the outcome.117 Whether Martens based this opinion on legal grounds exclusively or that 
extra-legal considerations, be this based on common sense or diplomatic pressure also had their 
say is another matter. So much for certain, Martens, here as at all times, will have aimed - suc-
cessfully in this case - at attaining a definite settlement of the dispute and at securing consensus. 
In doing so, he can be trusted to have remained well within the legal boundaries, but not neces-
sarily to the exclusion of other considerations. 
The lack of substantiation of the Orinoco-award may seem remarkable to us as contrary to pre-
vailing practice. As Martens himself pointed out during a session in The Hague in 1907 it was 
well belegt. Be this as it may, Martens' views can easily be accounted for by reference to Mar-
tens' insistence on the outward appearance of harmony within the panel. For all we know, he did 
indeed consider this instrumental to the authority and general acceptance of the award. So much 
for certain, Martens' position and role in the 1899 case can be easily verified to have been in 
perfect agreement with the numerous statements on the role of the umpire, the substantiation of 
the award and the publishing of dissenting opinions which he consistently made during both the 
1899 and 1907 Conferences. To that extent at least, it was all well above-board. 
To conclude, to his day and age at least, Martens' prominence in this domain was perhaps best 
illustrated by the great mural Les grands artisans de I'arbitrage, which was produced in 1897 by 
1 1 1 Schoenrich, in: 43 AJIL (1949) at 523-30 and Nussbaum 1952 at 58-60. 
m Child, in: 44 AJIL (1950) 682-693; Pustogarov 2000 at 202ff. 
1 1 1 Pustogarov 2000 at 206 refers a.o. to the honorary doctorate at Yale and Queen Victoria's explicit message of 
gratitude. 
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a French painter, Henri-Camille Danger, and which was on show at the 1898 Paris Salon.1 1 8 A 
glorious survey of the advocates of arbitration world-wide and through the centuries, it is remi-
niscent of Raphael's School of Athens in the Vatican (1509). In it feature 106 personages, from 
Confucius, Isaiah, Aristides and the Amphyctionic judges, to St. Paul, Marcus Aurelius and 
Louis IX. They are escorted by peace leaders such as Erasmus, Henri IV and De Sully, Leibniz, 
Abbe de St.-Pierre, Kant and Bentham, and contemporary figures such as Dudley Field, Cleve-
land, Mancini, Passy and Von Suttner. In the centre are the dedicatee, Czar Alexander III, flan-
ked by Count Orloff and - Feodor Martens. The huge panel was presented to the Czar.1 1 9 
3. The Peace Palace1 2 0 
In 1899 the American steel tycoon Andrew Carnegie sold out his imperium to Pierpont Morgan 
and retired from business. The transaction left him the Croesus of his times with an estimated 
capital of some US $ 480 million.121 In an interview in September with the English journalist and 
pacifist William Stead - a prominent member of that colourful coterie of peace apostles at the 
Hague Conference that was headed by the Baronesss Von Suttner122 - Carnegie mused on his 
"Gospel of Wealth" and how to embark upon that infinitely more complex task of distributing 
his amassed fortune to the benefit of the world. He welcomed any ideas that might help solve his 
"conundrum". In subsequent weeks, Stead interviewed a number of prominent public figures, 
Martens among them, as to their recommendations to the Scottish American. As early as Novem-
ber 1899 Martens suggested Carnegie's sponsoring of a proper Court House annex library of 
international law to serve the newly founded Permanent Court of Arbitration.123 Initially, nothing 
came of it. In months following, PCA headquarters were established in the Hague city centre. 
They were lodged in fairly modest quarters. Clearly, the Dutch Government had not incurred the 
risk of investing too deeply in the uncertain undertaking of a first ever international institution.124 
U 8 - Eyffinger 1999 at 334-335. 
U 9 ' The mural has not yet been verified. It is known from a lithograph only, but reference to its location in the 
Imperial Historical Museum in Moscow is found in the papers of Henry Dunant in Geneva, the Nobel Institute in 
Oslo, and the Carnegie-Foundation in The Hague. 
1 2 0 ' See Lysen History of the Carnegie Foundation 1934 (Bibl. Visser. XXVIII) and Eyffinger The Peace Palace 
1985. 
1 2 L See Eyffinger 1988 at 37-47. 
1 2 2 ' See Eyffinger 1999 at 56-57 and 62-63 respectively. Bloch and Moscheles were other prominent members. 
I 2 3 ' The reconstruction can be made from a letter by Martens to Fried dated 13-01-1905. See Fried 1909 at 122; 
Lysen 1934 at 3ff. 
m Lysen 1934 at 41ff. 
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In June 1900, by then a duly appointed member of the PC A, Martens paid a visit to an 
acquaintance of his, the then American ambassador to Berlin and former ambassador to St. 
Petersburg Andrew Dickson White, who had been his nation's first delegate at The Hague in 
1899.1 2 5 Knowing White to be an "old shoe" of Carnegie - the two had made a tour of the world 
together in the 1870s1 2 6 - Martens intimated his wish to see a Court House built in The Hague 
which could serve as definite headquarters for the PCA and as a centre of studies. This venue 
should become the very symbol of internationalism and should likewise host any future Peace 
Conferences. White consented to approach Carnegie and in years following both White and 
Martens paid complimentary visits to Skibo Castle, Carnegie's castle in the Scottish Highlands 
197 to advocate the idea. 
In 1902, Martens was on the PCA panel of the Pious Funds case. On that occasion, he expressed 
his discontent with the all too modest housing of the Court, which he deemed utterly inadequate 
and poorly situated, in no uncertain terms.1 2 8 By then, the joined endeavours of White, his col-
league Frederick W. Holls, Andersen and Martens had finally awoken Carnegie's keen interest. 
In October 1902, when both Martens and White were bestowed a honorary doctorate at Oxford, 
the latter - whose health had become extremely fragile - implored Martens to once more advo-
cate the idea with the millionaire.129 In May 1903, in the very weeks Martens gravitated to The 
Hague to take up his task in the Venezuelan Preferential Claims case, his efforts finally bore 
fruit when Carnegie awarded US $ 1,5 million for the establishment of a "Temple of Peace".1 3 0 
The next month, a government-steered Dutch Carnegie Foundation embarked on its veritable tale 
of misery to implement the gift. A full eighteen months later, in December 1904, no progress had 
been made whatsoever. Some fifteen locations in The Hague had been amply considered and 
dismissed. Protests were raised from all quarters and it was widely recommended, also by Carne-
gie himself, to have the Palace transferred to Brussels. 
At a loss what to do, the Board of the Carnegie Foundation finally settled for contracting a rather 
questionable spot, introduced a bill to Parliament to that end, and almost had the Royal Decree 
passed, when Martens once more visited The Hague to attend a meeting concerning an addition 
to the 1899 Hague Convention on the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the 
1 2 1 Lysen 1934 at 3-5. 
1 2 6 'Eyffinger 1988 at 42. 
1 2 7 ' That is, according to Prof, de Taube. See Lysen 1934 at 14-15. 
1 2 8 'Lysen 1934 at 42ff. 
1 2 9 'Lysen 1934 at 50. 
1 3 0-Eyffinger 1988 at 51-53. 
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Geneva Convention on Hospital Ships. Of his own accord Martens went visiting the allocated 
spot, was unable to locate it, went back with a native guide, felt appalled at identifying what he 
called a perfect swamp, and wrote a characteristic four-page letter in no uncertain terms to the 
Carnegie Foundation to make the Board retrace its steps.1 3 1 Astonishingly enough, this is what 
actually happened.132 A few months later a new bill was passed allocating the Palace to its pre-
sent spot. These were the very weeks of the Hull incident.133 Within months Martens was to see 
another idea of his, that of the International Commissions of Inquiry gloriously pass a first test 
under the auspices of the PC A. 
4. The Second Hague Peace Conference134 
The skies were not to remain that blue for long. Within a year, Mukden, Tsushima Straits, the 
disbanding of the Douma and Bloody Sunday made Martens turn morose as to the future of his 
beloved country. Second to Count Witte he helped negotiate the Portsmouth Treaty, which he 
personally deemed a disgrace to Russia. Already we had occasion to mention that his appraisal 
was probably wrong here.1 3 5 In 1906 Martens attended the Geneva Red Cross Conference, from 
there on to focus exclusively on the preparation of the Second Hague Peace Conference. As in 
1899, it was not to be smooth sailing. For all his authority abroad, at home his peacock once 
more had to swallow endless humiliations. 
Martens' preparation was hampered by various sources: lukewarm Petersburg officials, a 
wavering Czar, a change of Foreign Minister, and opposition to his person. Still, by January 
1907, all dark clouds seemed dispelled when he set out on his prestigious tour of Europe to 
sound the Governments as to their views on the Conference Programme. His personal authority 
and the nature of his mission warranted official receptions wherever he came. Indeed, Wilhelm 
II, Edward VII, the French Prime-Minister, Queen Wilhelmina and Franz-Joseph all received 
him in personal audience. Martens comments in his diaries on these meetings with dignitaries 
make for great reading.136 Criss-crossing Europe from Berlin to London and Paris, by early 
February and on his way to Vienna and Rome, he passed The Hague, were he was "fed from 
morning to night". Foreign Minister De Beaufort noted that Martens was in good health and 
1 3 1 Lysen 1934 at 81-84. 
1 3 2 ' Martens' was not an isolated protest, but may well have tipped the balance. 
1 3 3 ' Eyffinger 1999 at 445-47; Pustogarov 2000 at 28Iff. 
1 3 4 ' Pustogarov 2000 at 297-328. 
1 3 5 ' Pustogarov 2000 at 284ff. 
1 3 6 ' Pustogarov 2000 at 306-14. 
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spirit, but had definitely gained weight. Martens, on this meeting, showed himself fairly optimis-
tic both as regards the domestic theatre - the prospects for the new Douma, which he expected to 
be more moderate than its predecessor - and regarding the Peace Conference.137 
Martens was to be disillusioned on both accounts. In the end, and due not to any fault of his own, 
Martens' trip was not to be the success he had anticipated. He was duped by the Wilhelmstrasse 
1 
and grinded between "Nicky and Willy". Personal resentment at home at his international 
prominence invited obstructionism and caused ever new delays and irritation. Also, as compared 
to 1899, the skies over Europe had only darkened. All too high expectations for the Conference 
were definitely forestalled by the keen rivalry between Germany and Britain in matters of naval 
programmes. In London, Martens discussed the British wish for disarmament (while upholding 
its policy of "double supremacy") at some length with Lord Grey. Predictably, at The Hague, 
the mere discussion of British proposals for arms reduction was wrecked on a resolute German 
Nein. 
Still, in June, at the opening of the Conference, Martens returned to The Hague outwardly full of 
expectations. This in itself was an achievement. At 62, a veteran diplomat, legal luminary, and 
radiating authority, he had once more swallowed a distinct humiliation. To the embarrassment of 
all and sundry he had again been passed by as head of his nation's delegation in favour of 
Russia's ambassador in Paris, De Nelidov, otherwise a gentle and intelligent diplomat. Still, 
Martens took up his duties as before with all the energy and zeal he was known for. His preoccu-
pation was the presidency of the Fourth Committee on the laws and customs of maritime war-
fare. It was to be his last bow, and it was not to be an unqualified success.140 To start with, the 
Commission worked under a cloud: German-British rivalry and mutual suspicion as regards the 
conversion of merchant-vessels into war-ships precluded all compromise from day one. 
However, there was also a personal aspect to it. Within a matter of weeks Martens' wavering 
health became apparent. It soon dawned on his intimates that this was no longer the Martens of 
old. Faced with a deadlock within the Commission, and all too eager to impose his ideas on the 
Conference, his failing forces, rheumatism and mental depressions made him irritable. His im-
patience started to affect his personal contacts. Also, as was plain to see, the Russian delegation 
ni-Dagboeken De Beaufort I (1874-1910), The Hague 1993 [RGP Small Series no. 73] at 373-74. According to 
Pustogarov (at 310) Martens stayed in The Hague from February 4-8. That will be according to the Russian 
calendar. De Beaufort's entries would rather suggest 17-21 February. 
1 3 8 ' Pustogarov 2000 at 311. 
1 3 9 ' Pustogarov 2000 at 309. 
1 4 0'Pustogarov 2000 at 314-28. For the General Report of the proceedings within the Commission see Scott 
Proceedings I at 233-69. 
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was utterly divided in much the same way as the American had been in 1899. Charykov 
undermined Martens' authority. As a consequence, and unlike in 1899, when his relationship 
with President de Staal had been exemplary, Martens had some skirmishes with De Nelidow and 
henceforward proceeded on his own authority. In doing so, he most unfortunately ignored sus-
ceptibilities of colleagues, introduced ill-prepared propositions, embarrassed intimates with his 
rigidity, entered fierce polemics with the inflammable Ruy Barbosa, and, in the eyes of many, 
among these the Dutch delegation, mishandled a number of propositions with predictable failure 
to follow. On 17 July De Beaufort's diaries refer to his handling the American proposition regar-
ding contrabande as to the "highly biased presentation" by "the most partial chairman I have ever 
seen".1 4 1 
Unable to bend matters his way in the Fourth Commission, Martens, one may say, took refuge in 
the First Commission, which dealt with improving the 1899 Convention on the Peaceful Settle-
ment of Disputes. Intent on succeeding this time in advancing his "hobby horses" which we 
discussed above, Martens' attendance prompted heated debate in all matters which were so close 
to his heart: his desire to make the instrument of arbitration obligatory142; to turn the PCA into a 
Standing Court with teeth and claws1 4 3; to enforce the finality of arbitration awards1 4 4; and to 
upgrade the role of Commissions of Inquiry and entwine these into the regular settlement proce-
dure. He fought as a lion, one must grant him that. 
As in 1899, Martens repeatedly, and in the most eloquent terms, declared himself a convinced 
opponent of the concept of revision as contrary to the very idea of arbitration. Curious enough, at 
one stage of the debate, he referred to a public letter directed to that effect to the Dutch Foreign 
Minister by the 1902 Pious Funds Arbitration panel.1 4 5 In response, Beernaert and Choate milita-
ted strongly in favour of having the revision formula at hand in case new facts emerged or an 
apparent error on the part of the tribunal had come to light. As Choate concluded: "the sole 
object of arbitration is to do justice", to which Martens replied: "no, its sole object is to settle a 
dispute - for once and for good." On which Barbosa riposted: "revision is of the essence in 
arbitration. Arbitration is a means of peace only because it is an instrument of justice."1 4 6 The 
debate reveals Martens' approach. More than anything, to him the instrument was an avenue to 
I 4 L Dagboeken De Beaufort I at 388. 
1 4 2 ' Scott Proceedings II99,102,175,378,406-11 etc. 
143' Ibid. II619-701. 
1 4 4 Ibid. II 369ff. 
145' Ibid. II 369ff.; II 949ff. 
146 Ibid. II 369-371. Cf. also Wehberg 1910 at 349: "internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit...is..nicht lediglich, wie 
v. Martens einmal sagte, "Aus-der-Weltschaffung von Streitigkeiten." 
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settle dispute and secure peace. Revision, in his eyes, would open the way for politicians to 
"perpetuate" dispute and involve endless procedural complications. A much similar discussion 
on principle was entered with respect to the substantiation of the award and the explicit reference 
to dissenting opinions of arbitrators.147 
To Martens, 1899 had been sowing-time. In the intervening years various germs had proven their 
potential of sprouting. Now he intended to reap. It was not to be. The major powers, still taken 
somewhat unaware in 1899, for all their disagreements, easily agreed on setting strict boundaries 
to these innovative mechanisms which, for all their intransparancies, were sure to intrude on 
their sovereignty. At this stage, the Standing Court of Arbitration and the Prize Court, for all the 
rhetoric, were not to be, whatever stratagem, fallacy, or sophism this would take. It was to be left 
to the Killing Fields of Flanders and a new generation to break this deadlock. Only, Martens 
could not wait that long. 
Clearly, as a tactician Martens was not at his best these months. Did he anticipate that this was to 
be his last stand? At all accounts, his pressure on delegates, not just to come to terms, but on his 
terms, backfired on his prestige. On 10 October reference is made by De Beaufort to the conclu-
ding session of the First Commission on obligatory arbitration and Martens' extreme clumsiness 
in advocating what he presented as a Russian conciliatory proposition. In fact he had concocted 
the idea with Bourgeois and the French delegation without ever consulting De Nelidow or for 
that matter the German delegation. Much to the fury of Kriege, who observed: "Wir sind furcht-
bar gereizt, eine Katastrophe ist sehr nahe." Already on an earlier occasion the German first 
delegate Marschall von Bieberstein had argued most categorically, that "Libertas" was the cor-
nerstone of arbitration.148 In the end, Martens was forced to withdraw his proposition for lack of 
 " support. 
This kind of surprise attack was an error of judgement which was typical, it would seem, of 
Martens' obstinacy in his later years to secure results at all costs and enforce structural progress 
in the face of opposition. His proposition with respect to the law of prize laboured from similar 
defects. As Wehberg observes, the previous year, when attending the Geneva Red Cross Con-
ference in Geneva, Martens had made a much similar counter-productive move in proposing the 
1 4 7 ' Scott Proceedings II 364ff. 
148' Ibid. II371. 
149, Dagboeken De Beaufort I at 408-11. As the Dutch Minister comments: "The clumsiness of Martens' defence 
was positively astounding. Repeatedly this most able and learned man attests to his failing policy in handling 
matters. I presume that, as a Russian, he is wont to address people of limited education and servile attitude and is 
therefore encouraged to submit propositions whose deeper purpose is crystal-clear to all and sundry at the Confe-
rence, in spite of all his sophisms." On the issue see Scott Proceedings II 134-40, 165-77, 904-05. De Beaufort's 
diaries also make reference to Martens' involvement with the Prize Court (at 400-01). 
54 
Feodor Martens, Architect of the Hague Tradition of International Law 
unaware delegates that all disputes on the interpretation of the Convention were to be submitted 
automatically to the PCA. However, as Pustogarov maintains, on Martens' part, this move was 
precisely meant to sound the feasibility of the idea in anticipation of the Hague Conference.150 
Meanwhile, the above proposition recalls the much similar procedure Martens proposed in 1907 
with respect to his brain-child, the Commissions of Inquiry, which had so eminently served their 
purpose on the occasion of the Hull-incident.151 In case of a stalemate or failure of this mecha-
nism, Martens argued at The Hague, nations should bind themselves to automatically submit the 
issue to the PCA. For this reason, the third member of the Commission should be selected from 
the list of arbitrators kept by the Hague Bureau. Again, the praiseworthy objective of this "doub-
le tie" as Martens called it, was to enhance the effectiveness of the 1899 convention.152 However, 
his insisting on the "moral duty" of the Conference to comply with these proposals merely cau-
sed irritation, and it is hard to decide whether Martens was actually blind for the objections 
raised from many quarters or simply wished to have it his way.1 5 3 
In tirelessly advocating his various propositions, Martens voiced his firm conviction that 
arbitration was meant to put an end to disputes between sovereign nations. All his arguments 
were aimed at this goal and inter-linked thereto: they were presented by him as a package deal. 
Making allowances for the obstruction from diplomats and the military class, it must have been a 
truly sobering experience to him that very few of his convictions were shared unrestrictedly by 
his legal colleagues from the Institut. Arbitration was generally viewed as first and foremost an 
instrument of law. Martens' views made him liable to the reproach of considering arbitration 
panels as political rather than legal institutions. Merely settling conflict without a solid legal 
basis, it was widely argued, was to prompt ever new disputes. Martens ended up in the cross-fire. 
Be this as it may, one cannot but admire Martens' repeated efforts for what he saw as the best 
avenue ahead. In retrospect, one may perhaps evaluate Martens' approach as an effort to firmly 
implant the new mechanisms and institutions into the social life of his times and thereby break 
away from 19th century diplomacy, whithout bothering too much with legal niceties which, in his 
view, could be optimized once the instruments had been generally accepted. As the following 
decades and the ongoing work of the Institut which culminated in the preparatory commission of 
the PCIJ would tell, there was no way in which the 1907 Conference, in a single move, could 
have possibly removed all the stumbling-blocks to the implementation of international adjudic-
1 5 0 ' Wehberg 1910 at 346; Pustogarov 2000 at 302. 
15 L Scott Proceedings II 222ff. 
1 5 1 Cf. Wehberg 1910 at 347. 
1 5 3 ' Scott Proceedings II18-219,223,380-404. 
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ation the way Martens had envisaged. The 1907 debate first dawned up to, and then only tentati-
vely started mapping, the immense legal and political minefields barring the crossing of that 
watershed. 
Martens' behaviour in The Hague was perhaps typical of the concluding days of his career, when 
he lost grip on affairs and saw his ideals slipping away. Faced with the inexorable, all his charms 
seemed to evaporate. His heavy-handed attempts at the jocund never made a head-way. His po-
wer of persuasion turned into stubborn rigidity and intimate friends saw, much to their regret, the 
former master of compromise give way to the pedant wiseacre. Although being incessantly 
implored by relatives at home to return before August, he held on doggedly well into October, 
limping and suffering from spasms of rheumatism. He badly needed a Spa at Baden, but was 
intent on rounding off what he, with some justice, considered his cause.1 5 4 In the final analysis, 
most of what he advocated in 1907, if visionary, was premature and had to await a future gene-
ration. Some ideas were counter-productive and have been distinctly belied by time. 
Still, whatever else may be said of it, even in the weeks of his last bow, Martens rendered some 
addresses which may count among the most eloquent and truly inspired ones ever rendered in the 
history of the Hague institutions.155 There were moments, in 1907 as in 1899, when the glow of 
his rhetoric, his deep feeling and humane approach, and his visionary panoramas of a better 
world to be, swept all before them. Such as his opening speech in the Fourth Commission on 
June 24 with reference to Paul's address at the Areopagus in Athens and the altar of the "Un-
known God". 
"Methinks that in that 'Huis ten Bosch', in that chamber filled with magnificent paintings, there 
also stood an altar, above which I did not read the inscription stating that it was sacred to the 
"Unknown God." No, I saw emblazoned the inscription that that altar was sacred to the "God of 
Right, of Justice, and of Peace. This God [...] was not an "Unknown God" to the members of the 
First Conference. No, he possessed their souls and was rooted in their hearts. [...] The Fourth 
Commission will keep this altar in sight and will draw its inspiration.. ," 1 5 6 
1 5 4 ' Cf.Wehberg 1910 at 357: "Aber auch auf der zweiten Friedenskonferenz muss man sinen hohen Eifer und seine 
unermiidliche Tatigkeit fur den Fortschritt hoch einschatzen. Schon lange vor Schluss der Konferenz solte er 
wegen seines Leidens abreisen, aber er hielt standhaft auf seinem Posten aus." 
1 5 5 ' Scott Proceedings 1333-35; III 741-43; III 913-15. Cf. Wehberg 1910 at 351: "Aber trotzdem glaube ich, dass v. 
Martens, der in seinem Leben auch dichterisch hervorgetreten ist und sich bei seinen Reden gewiss oft selbst an 
dem Schwunge seiner eigenen Worte hat berauschen wollen, dennoch in seinem Herzen .. .fest Ueberzeugt war." 
1 5 6 , Scott Proceedings III 741-43. The theme, incidentally, was a favourite of Hugo Grotius who, still a youngster, 
rendered the text into a Latin poetical paraphrasis. 
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Or his reference in the First Commission to the great ideals of mankind: 
I have concluded, gentlemen; allow me a few words more from the bottom of my heart. There 
have always been in history epochs when grand ideals have dominated and enthralled the souls 
of men; sometimes it was religion, sometimes a system of philosophy, sometimes a political 
theory. The most shining example of this kind was the crusades. From all countries arose the cry, 
"To Jerusalem! God wills it!" To-day the great ideal, which dominates our time is that of arbitra-
tion. Whenever a dispute arises between the nations, even though it be not amenable to 
arbitration, we hear the unanimous cry, ever since the year 1899, "To the Hague!" If we are all 
agreed that this ideal shall take body and soul, we may leave The Hague with uplifted head and 
peaceful conscience; and history will inscribe within her annals: The Members of the Second 
Peace Conference have deserved well of humanity. (Prolonged Applause)151 
Or, to turn from the public to the private domain, Martens' personal tribute to Leon Bourgeois 
and the latter's "understanding of heart": 
"Intelligence by itself can command and even reign. But intelligence without heart will never 
form lasting bonds and friendships which give warmth and beauty to life."1 5 8 
Man is a complicated being. Martens may have struck colleagues as an unfathomable character, 
reserved, a man of the mind and without much outward warmth. Yet Martens, at his best, counte-
red legalism with ethics and his "intelligence de coeur". And whenever arbitration or humani-
tarian issues were at stake, Martens was invariably at his very best. 
5. Epilogue 
When Martens left The Hague it was full of anticipation to return within a matter of years to 
attend a Third Conference on the premises of the Peace Palace, for which his first delegate, 
Count Nelidov had laid the first stone that summer. It was not to be. The end came in 1909. 
Desillusion no doubt played its part in the decline. Raised in Pobedonosef s doctrine of strictest 
autocracy and orthodoxy, the Western-oriented Martens was very critical of the wide-spread 
illiteracy and obscurantism in Russia. While urging for acute social reform, he anticipated mere 
1 5 7 ' Scott Proceedings 1328 
1 5 8 ' Ibid. 1334. 
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chaos from socialism.159 Martens eagerly awaited an enlightened, law-abiding Czar to tread in 
the footsteps of Alexander II. Initially cherishing high expectations of Nicholas II, he was soon 
to be disillusioned. Bloody Sunday and the disbanding of the Douma had left him shattered. 
F.F. Martens was a man of strong character, enormous will-power, and an independent mind. He 
was an energetic organiser and an inspiring teacher. He was a scholar of imposing, though 
somewhat ponderous erudi tion and, although not blessed with the intuitive fifth sense of the true-
born diplomat, he was a versatile and able negotiator. Martens felt perfectly at home in the inter-
national arena, indeed perhaps better so than in ministerial circles at home. Whatever Martens' 
shortcomings in terms of character or mistaken convictions, to his day and age he made a diffe-
rence, more so indeed than many more cautious and circumspect colleagues, more so too than 
the specialists who clung within the precinct of a single discipline. Martens' essentially interdis-
ciplinary, social approach was the outcome of his many academic, official, and practical commit-
ments. It lent him an outlook on his contemporary world, which was relatively rare to the point 
of giving rise to misunderstanding. 
Whatever the debts of St. Petersburg, The Hague is infinitely indebted to this true architect of the 
Oeuvre de la Hccye. One may summarize his achievements this way. If not for Martens, no Peace 
Conference would ever have taken place in The Hague. And if so, if not for Martens it would not 
have been properly organized. And if so, if not for Martens, it would not have included the issue 
of arbitration. And if so, if not for Martens it would not have ensued in the constituting of the 
PCA. And if so, if not for Martens, the idea of a Peace Palace would never have risen. And if so, 
if not for Martens, it would not have been established on its present location. To The Hague at 
least, Feodor Martens made all the difference. 
We have come full circle - and Professor Holland, whom we met at the opening of our quest, is 
awaiting us. It is time to reveal the secret hidden in his three majestic words "Magnus vir 
cecidit". Holland, needless to say, knew his classics. The words are taken from Seneca's Moral 
Essays - these gems of wisdom so recommended to all lawyers by Hugo Grotius himself.1 6 0 In 
1 5 9 , In his 1882 treatise Martens named all revolutionaries indiscriminately "anarchists" and "dynamiters" who threa-
tened legal order within Russia and abroad. See Puistogarov 2000 at 36, with referenc to the 1882 treatise at 162-
80, 381-417. 
1 6 0 ' Hugo Grotius in a letter to B. Aubery du Maurier dated 13 May 1615 [copy Paris, Bibl. Nat., Fonds Dupuy 16 f. 
93], See Briefwisseling Hugo Grotius, Vol. 1, ed. Molhuysen, The Hague 1928, at 384ff. The letter was pub-
lished separately in 1626 as De studiis instituendis. See Reeves, "Grotius on the Training of Ambassadors', in 23 
AJIL (1929) 619-625. 
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his Essay to Helvia on Consolation161, Seneca recalls the death of Aristides, that epitome of 
1 ffl virtue. The wider context of Professor Holland's quote is reproduced here as a fitting tribute: 
At Athens, when Aristides was being led to death, everyone who met him would cast down his 
eyes and groan, feeling that it was not merely a just man, but Justice herself who was being doo-
med to die; yet one man was found who spat in his face... [...] I know that there are some who 
say that nothing is harder to bear than scorn, that death itself seems more desirable to them. To 
these I will reply that even exile is often free from any mark of scorn. If a great man falls, though 
prostrate, he is still great - men no more scorn him, I say, than they tread upon the fallen walls of 
a temple, which the devout still revere as deeply as when they were standing...1 6 3 
Holland himself had locked horns with his colleague on various occasions, stag versus stag one 
may say. But he for one never failed to see the true stature of Feodor Martens. 
I 6 1 , Seneca, Moral Essays [Dialogi], lib. xii: AdHelviam Matrem, De Consolatione. 
1 6 2 Aristides (fl. first part 5 t h c. B.C.), Athenian statesman of proverbial honesty from the days of Salamis. 
1 6 3 ' Sen. Helv. Cons, xiii.8. The passus reads: "Si magnus vir cecidit, magnus iacuit, non magis ilium contemni, 
quam aedium sacrarum ruinae calcantur, quas religiosi aeque ac stantis adorant." Translation J.W. Basore (1932) 
in Loeb Classical Library Vol. 254, Cambridge, Ma. / London 1970 at 464ff. 
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